Dont be afraid. Just take it easy, easy. Let women and children go first. Plenty of buses will come. We will transfer you towards Kladanj. From there you will cross to the territory controlled by Alijas forces. Just dont panic. Let women and little children go through first. Do not let any of the children get lost. Dont be afraid. Nobody will harm you.

Following Mladiçs remarks to the press, the deportation of the roughly 20,000 people outside the Dutchbat compound began. The BSA troops immediately began separating the men (between the ages of approximately 16 and 65) from the women, children and elderly who were boarding the buses. Thus, only a small number of the men were able to make it on the first few buses, after which none were allowed to board them. There are varying estimates as to how many men within this age group were outside the compound at that point. Some are as high as 3,000, others are substantially lower. These men outside the compound were systematically being directed away from the buses destined for Kladanj, and towards what has come to be known as the white house located directly in front of the Dutchbat compound in Poto...ari.

As this was taking place, the Dutchbat Deputy Commander instructed the civilian representatives to draw up a list of all the men between the ages of 16 and 65 both inside and outside the compound. The representatives objected, and protested that the evacuation plan that they had prepared was being ignored. Nevertheless, another civilian proceeded to draw up a list of 239 men in the compound. It appears that at least 60 men refused to allow their names to be put on the list. No such list was drawn up for the men who were outside the compound. The Deputy Battalion Commander has since explained that he insisted on the list being drawn up in order to forward the information to the ICRC and other authorities, so as to keep track of the men. He has further explained that he initially protested to the BSA about the separation of the men, but relented when the latter claimed that the men would not be harmed and would simply be questioned as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

By the end of the day on 12 July, some 5,000 women, children and elderly were deported by the BSA to Kladanj, via Bratunac- Nova Kasaba-Miliçi-Vlasenica-Tišça and Luka, from where they were forced to walk 6 km to the confrontation line near Kladanj. The journey by road appears to have taken approximately 6 hours. Dutchbat were not able to put a soldier on each of the buses as they had intended because of the unexpected numbers of and speed with which the buses arrived. Thus, they decided to provide one escort vehicle for each of the convoys. During their debriefing, the Dutchbat members involved in the escorts reported that they had not seen any maltreatment of the occupants of the convoys, though they admitted that they would not necessarily have been able to detect if any of the buses within the convoys were diverted elsewhere; some of the convoys were apparently too long for them to keep all buses in sight. By the end of the day, the BSA had hijacked 13-14 of the Dutchbat vehicles that were escorting the convoys, along with their weapons and equipment.

It has since been learned that the small number of men who had managed to board these buses at Poto...ari were detected and separated from the convoys between Tišça and Luka and placed in an elementary school at Luka. One to two days later, the BSA loaded 25 of them onto a truck, drove them to an isolated pasture near Vlasenica, where they were shot.

Meanwhile, during the course of the day, the Force Commander sent a letter to General Mladiç in which he wrote: the humanitarian situation in Poto...ari is possibly worse than at any time in this sad and unnecessary war, and will certainly become a disaster of unparalleled magnitude if urgent measures are not immediately taken. My aim in writing to you on this subject is to enlist your support in saving lives on a grand scale. The Force Commander proposed that Mladiç allow heavy-lift United Nations helicopters to fly in food and medicine to Poto...ari, and that the wounded be medically evacuated to central Bosnia. He also proposed to send a negotiating team to Poto...ari to act as his personal envoys, and enter into negotiations with the aim of saving further lives. He continued that: ...An early sign of your goodwill in these negotiations will be to allow them free access into Poto...ari, and thereafter unrestricted movement. Mladiç subsquently refused any overture from the Force Commander, or senior UNPROFOR officers based in Sarajevo, to travel to Srebrenica to negotiate with him. In fact, General Gvero told the UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff on the afternoon of 12 July that the BSA would only deal with the Dutchbat Commander and that they refused to allow the helicopter flights into Srebrenica, because they could not guarantee their safety.

B.
12 July
-- Security Council Resolution 1004

By mid-afternoon Bosnia time on 12 July, the Security Council in New York had convened in emergency session. It unanimously adopted resolution 1004 (1995) which, under Chapter VII of the Charter, demanded that the Bosnian Serb forces cease their offensive and withdraw from the safe area of Srebrenica immediately. It demanded full unimpeded access for UNHCR and other international humanitarian organizations to the safe area of Srebrenica in order to alleviate the plight of the civilian population. The Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to use all resources available to him to restore the status as defined by the Agreement of 18 April 1993 on the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance with the mandate of UNPROFOR, and [called] on the parties to cooperate to that end.

During the debate on that resolution (see S/PV.3553 of 12 July 1995), some of the members of the Council clarified their positions. Prior to the vote being taken, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina was given the floor, during which time he read out a statement by President Izetbegoviç. In it, the President demanded that the UN and NATO reestablish by force the violated safe zone of Srebrenica within the borders before the attack, namely of May 1993", and added: if they cannot or do not want to do this, we demand that this be publicly announced.

The representative of France then stated that his Government did not wish to impose the use of any particular means. He added: we are simply saying that we are ready, if the civilian and military authorities and the United Nations force consider it appropriate, to make troops available for any operations they regard as realistic and realizeable.

The representative of Italy, in referring to the operative paragraph mentioned above, stated that his Government strongly hoped that this objective will be achieved by peaceful means through negotiation and persuasion.

The representative of Nigeria stated that today in Bosnia there is no peace to keep and no political will to impose one. Herein lies the dilemma of the continued involvement of the United Nations with the situation....The fall of the safe area of Srebrenica simply adds to the dilemma and reinforces what we have all known -- that is that the phrase safe areas is becoming a sad misnomer...the draft resolution before us is intended to reverse the latest of the debacles that have befallen the international community in trying to confront a determined and systematic aggressor. Whether the draft resolution contains enough strong elements and any additional political will which will finally convince the aggressor of our collective determination to draw the line remains to be seen.

The representative of the Russian Federation stated: we must again note that the use of air power is not the road to a solution. Nor do we see a solution in the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Bosnia or a build-up of pressure by force, which would have serious adverse consequences, but rather in ensuring the secure and effective functioning of UNPROFOR. We note that the draft resolution mandates the Secretary-General to use all resources available to him to restore the status as defined by the Agreement of 18 April 1993 on the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance with the mandate of UNPROFOR. It is clear that this provision precludes the option of using force which would exceed the context of the present mandate of a peacekeeping operation.

Following the vote on the resolution, the representative of the United States stated: obviously, we all prefer peaceful means, but when brutal force is used the Secretary-General must have the right to use the resources available to him, in consultation with the relevant troop contributors, as stated in this resolution, to employ our resources in the most effective manner possible to meet the humanitarian needs of so many desperate Bosnian citizens and to achieve a lasting peace. To help achieve these ends, my Government firmly believes that UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia, supported by the rapid-reaction force....

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that this Council has now requested the Secretary-General to use all resources available to him to promote the restoration of the status of Srebrenica as a safe area, as agreed by the parties in April 1993. It is through demilitarization of the area that the civilian population who wish to do so will be able to remain without fear. This Council has reaffirmed that objective. We hope that UNPROFOR, acting within its mandate, can bring the parties once more to recognize that full implementation of the April 1993 Agreement represents the best way forward.

The representative of China then spoke, stating that his Government had reservations about taking enforcement action by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, as set forth in the resolution. He added that his Government was also concerned and disturbed at the serious political and military consequences that might arise from the actions authorized in the resolution, in particular, the possibility that the peacekeeping force could thus become a party to the conflict and lose the basis of its continued existence as a result.

The representative of the Czech Republic stated that the demands contained in [this] Security Council resolution...are fair and should be met. However, past experience shows, and not only in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that unless our demands are underpinned by a genuine resolve and determination to see them through, they will remain unfulfilled. The party to which todays resolution is particularly addressed knows this, and I am sure that its leaders will be very carefuly assessing our response to their challenge. If today we have adopted just another resolution full of demands that will not be underpinned by our determination to see them fulfilled, then we will be doing more harm than good, not only to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also to the position of the Security Council. The Bosnian Serbs will be reaffirmed in their belief that Security Council resolutions are just paper tigers. They will be tempted to repeat what they did in Srebrenica in ðepa, Gorañde and other so-called safe areas, knowing that they can do so with impunity.

The United Nations Secretariat had forwarded a copy of the draft resolution to the SRSG the previous day, for his comments. The SRSG expressed concern at the implications of operative paragraph 6 to use force to restore the status of the safe area. He concluded that the resolution would again raise unrealistic expectations and could potentially be interpreted as authorizing the use of force by the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to re-take Srebrenica, which would again blur the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The Force Commander immediately began to prepare an assessment of the feasibility of re-establishing the safe area by force, as requested by the United Nations Secretariat. He communicated his preliminary thoughts that this was not an option which could be achieved with the resources presently available to UNPROFOR. The Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs agreed with the assessment of the SRSG and the Force Commander that, under the circumstances, negotiations would offer the only hope of achieving the objectives identified by the Security Council, and for that purpose, it would be necessary to open dialogue with the Bosnian Serbs. They proposed that the Secretary-General appoint a Special Envoy to take on this role, and in this regard suggested that Mr. Stoltenberg was immediately available to do so. The Secretary-General, who was travelling in Africa as these events were unfolding, agreed.

C.
Night of 12 July
-- Sporadic killings begin

As night fell on Poto...ari on 12 July following the Security Councils adoption of resolution 1004 (1995), the white house in front of the Dutchbat Compound began to fill-up with Bosniac men, and the BSA began transporting them to Bratunac, where upon arrival they were packed into a hangar. The Dutchbat were not permitted to accompany them, or even escort the buses transporting them. One individual who was transported to Bratunac from Poto...ari, known as Witness A, later testified to the Tribunal in July 1996 that during the course of the night of 12 July, the BSA dragged men out of the hangar, one by one, and beat them with blunt instruments. Based on his testimony, it appears that there were at least a few hundred men in the hangar at this time. The same source assessed that the BSA killed roughly 50 of these men during the course of the night.

At around midnight on 12 July, a convoy that had departed Poto...ari six hours earlier arrived near the disembarkation point en route to Kladanj. Dutchbat personnel had managed to accompany this convoy of seven vehicles, carrying 54 wounded and 10 locally-recruited MSF employees. During their debriefing, the Dutchbat personnel reported that the BSA turned aggressive when they saw that 20 of the wounded were military-aged men. The BSA dragged the wounded off the vehicles and forced them to proceed on foot to Kladanj. Many of these, the Dutchbat assessed, would have had to crawl the 6-7 kilometres to Kladanj because they were unable to walk. The Dutchbat personnel also reported that the BSA detained at least two or three female MSF employees, and that they did not know of their fate. While the wounded who could either walk or crawl proceeded towards Kladanj, there were still 34 wounded who could not even crawl. The BSA refused the Dutchbat request to assist them. These 34 were left on the vehicles, which were then sent back to Bratunac. That convoy was forced to wait until morning, at the enclave boundary between Poto...ari and Bratunac, by which time one of the wounded had died.

The Dutch debriefing report also indicated that during the night of 12-13 July, the BSA was probably committing further abuses against the men in Poto...ari. The report noted that during the early evening of 12 July, a Dutchbat soldier saw about 10 people led by two armed BSA soldiers in a westerly direction from the Dutchbat compound towards a dirt track. Several soldiers from Dutchbat went to the area on 13 July and found the corpses of nine men near a stream. All of the dead had gunshot wounds in their backs at heart level. In another incident, Dutchbat personnel saw BSA soldiers force at least five men into a large factory opposite the Poto...ari compound. Shortly afterwards, they heard five or six shots. A Serb soldier later emerged from the factory, armed with a pistol, but the Dutchbat soldiers were unable to ascertain what had taken place. Another Dutchbat soldier described an incident where he saw a man kneeling or sitting in the middle of a group of Serbs. The group was approached by a number of Serb soldiers, who took the man and dragged him to an area behind a house. Screams and a shot were then heard, and the soldiers returned alone, shook hands with the other Serbs and left; the Dutchbat soldier could not establish at that time whether an execution had taken place. In another account, a Dutchbat soldier saw five male refugees disembark from a mini-bus near the Poto...ari compound entrance. Two of the men tried to flee, but ran straight into Bosnian Serb soldiers. The Dutchbat soldier heard two shots and saw both men fall to the ground.

Also on the night of 12 July, as the front of the column of the approximately 15,000 men proceeded north and then west from Srebrenica, Serb fighters began to close in on them, using not only longer range heavy weapons, but also mortars, bazookas and small arms. The Serbs established a cordon along the paved road that passed through Konjeviç Polje and Nova Kasaba and across which the Bosniacs would have to pass. The first Bosniac units crossed the road before the cordon was fully established, just south of Konjeviç Polje. Crossing the road, the Bosniacs heard Serb patrols hailing them with megaphones, urging them to surrender. They also saw UNPROFOR vehicles (which had been comandeered by the Serbs) and soldiers in blue helmets.

Behind this first group of Bosniacs, the middle section of the column was being ambushed. A large section of the column had stopped to rest at a clearing near Kamenica, known locally as Kameni...ko Brdo. Survivors recalled that a group of at least a thousand Bosniacs were engaged at close range by small arms. Hundreds appear to have been killed as they fled the clearing. The skeletelized remains of some of those killed in this ambush remained clearly visible to ICTY investigators and United Nations staff members passing through in 1996. Survivors recalled how many wounded were left behind, some of whom shot themselves or detonated grenades in order to escape capture. Some wounded were carried on with the survivors, later surrendering.

In summary, there is strong documentation to suggest that executions did take place on 12 July, into the night and early morning hours of 13 July. It does not appear, however, that the largest executions had yet taken place. Information from Serb sources appears to suggest that the decision to kill the men of Srebrenica might have been taken only after the fall of Srebrenica. The decision to assemble a large number of civilian and military vehicles for the deportation process appears to have been taken independently. Information presently available does not suggest that vehicles from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were engaged at this stage.

D.
13 July
-- the killing of hundreds of unarmed men and boys begins

The UNMOs in Srebrenica reported that the Serbs had resumed the deportation of the population outside the Poto...ari compound at approximately 0700 hours on 13 July. The Serbs again continued to separate the men from the women and children, diverting the men to Bratunac. As before, the BSA prevented Dutchbat from following the latter group, or ascertaining where the men were being taken. The UNMOs also reported that they would try and investigate a rumour that the Serbs had killed several men that they had taken out of the crowd the previous day. Neither the UNMOs nor Dutchbat reported that they had observed or had reason to believe that any other abuses had been committed thus far. Dutchbats capacity to monitor the situation, however, had been sharply reduced; no longer possessing the vehicles required to escort each of the convoys, they had established four static checkpoints along the route to Kladanj on which the BSA had transported the population the previous day.

On the morning of 13 July, the first group of Bosniac men in the woods that had passed through the Serb cordons and had survived the ambush at Kamenicko Brdo, pressed on to high groud at Udriç in the municipality of Vlasenica, sporadically firing back at the pursuing Serbs. There they rested again, waiting for nightfall before moving out of forest cover to the north. For the next three days the column moved further north, largely at night and, where possible, in the shelter of the forest. Groups of men further back in the column began to surrender to the BSA in large numbers at this time, in two main areas: the first group surrendered in the Sandici meadow, west of Kravica; the second just north of Nova Kasaba near the football field. Large numbers of both groups that had surrendered were taken to Bratunac. Several hundred were not taken to Bratunac, however. They appear instead to have been packed into an agricultural warehouse in Kravica and killed by small arms fire and grenades. Visiting the Kravica warehouse several months later, United Nations personnel were able to see hair, blood and human tissue caked to the inside walls of this building. The inside walls, floor and ceiling were also marked by the impacts of gunshots and explosions. One section of the wall had also been knocked down, apparently to facilitate the process of loading the remains of bodies into waiting vehicles. A smaller group, of approximately 70 individuals, appears to have been taken to a meadow near Kravica and shot along the river bank. None of this was known to outsiders at the time, until one of the survivors of the Kravica massacres, who had managed to hide under a pile of dead bodies for roughly nine hours, later escaped and told members of the media and international organizations what he had witnessed. ICTY was able to corroborate the account through forensic evidence obtained during exhumations in 1996.

The UNMOs reported that by 1715 hours, the Serbs had completed the transport of all of the civilians outside the Poto...ari Compound and had now begun the deportation of those within the compound. They assessed that the BSA would be able to complete the process within the hour. Most of those on the list of 239 men that had been prepared the day before, plus the group of at least 60 men who had refused to be put on the list, were still in the compound at this point. One witness who spoke with these men maintains that they felt that if they were handed over to the BSA, they would be killed. This witness adds that these fears were expressed to the Dutchbat Deputy Commander, who was also reminded that the bodies of 9-10 men had been found next to a nearby stream, having been summarily executed. They pleaded not to be handed over to the Serbs, but to no avail. Dutchbat then ordered them to leave the compound and present themselves to the waiting Serbs. The Dutchbat personnel concerned have since stated that they did not believe they were handing these men over to certain death, and that they believed the men would be treated by the Serbs in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. They felt that, having prepared a list of the names of those handed over, the men would enjoy some degree of security. All 239 men on the list are still missing.

As the process of deportation was coming to an end, the first UNHCR team was able to reach what was left of the Srebrenica enclave. The UNHCR convoy had set out from Belgrade on 12 July, but had been stopped at the international border, and allowed to proceed only on the afternoon of 13 July. The convoy passed through Bratunac, where Serb soldiers, many of whom appeared to be drunk, could be seen celebrating in the streets. The convoy then proceeded to Poto...ari, where they found UNPROFOR and Serb soldiers working together to bring the last groups of Bosniacs from the UNPROFOR compound to the waiting Serb buses. When this operation was completed, and after having attempted to secure safe passage out of Poto...ari for UNHCRs local staff members, the UNHCR convoy returned to Bratunac. There the UNHCR staff members heard from local Serbs that large numbers of Bosniacs were being held at the nearby football field. Darkness was falling, and from their motel rooms, the UNHCR team could hear sporadic shooting from the direction of the football field.

By the end of the day on 13 July, there were virtually no Bosniac males left in the former safe area of Srebrenica. Almost all were in one of four categories:

The UNMOs and Dutchbat were aware that Bosniac men were being detained in Bratunac, but did not know the precise numbers or locations. There is now strong evidence that between 4,000 to 5,000 Bosniac males were being held there in different locations around town: a warehouse; an old school; three lines of trucks and buses, a football field. The Dutchbat soldiers being detained in Bratunac, meanwhile, were located in different locations (the Hotel Fontana and the Technical School, both of which are close to the football field).

Although the precise details of what happened to the men of Srebrenica on 13 July have only been reconstructed after subsequent enquiry over the past 4 years, there was concern at the time, and at least five written messages were sent on that day, expressing alarm about potential human rights abuses having been committed or that potentially might be committed.

On the afternoon of 13 July, the UNMOs reported that General Mladiç had told them that there were several hundred bodies of dead Bosniac soldiers in the Bandera triangle portion of the enclave. Mladiç had requested Dutchbat to inform the ARBiH that that it was not his intention to kill any more soldiers. They only have to surrender and hand over their weapons. However, the BSA did not permit the UNMOs or Dutchbat to visit the area to verify that the bodies were indeed there. This report was subsequently forwarded up the United Nations chain of command, reaching the Secretariat in New York the next morning. The SRSG requested that the report not be made public, in order not to place the UNMOs in Srebrenica in further danger.

A team of UNMOs in Sector Northeast separately reported that they had spoken to some of the refugees arriving in Kladanj from Poto...ari. The refugees told of having witnessed men being separated from others, severely beaten, stoned and in some cases stabbed. They added that 30-35 wounded had been taken to Bratunac, and that another vehicle had disappeared en route to the drop-off point. In another report on 13 July, the UNPROFOR Commander (who had been recalled from leave) informed the SRSG and the Force Commander that reports of abductions and murder, unconfirmed as of yet, are beginning to be heard from the Srebrenica area.

The Chargé dAffaires of the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina also officially expressed his Governments concern on 13 July, in a letter to the Secretary-General, the text of which was circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/50/285; S/1995/573). He communicated the reports his Government had heard that men aged 13 years and older had been separated from those transported to Kladanj, and that their whereabouts were unknown. He added that there had been additional reports of women between the ages of 15 and 35 whose whereabouts were also unknown. He noted that the fate of these detainees is uncertain and there are substantial grounds to fear their execution, though these reports could not yet be confirmed. He concluded his letter by stating that since the United Nations has failed to defend the population of Srebrenica, on United Nations demilitarized territory, it is not absolved of its obligations to provide for them now, once in Government-held territory, after having exposed them to life threatening danger resulting from the absence of timely United Nations action.

The Secretariat also learned from another source on 13 July that the Serbs had separated males of military age from amongst the displaced persons and brought them to Bratunac. The same day, the Secretariat expressed concern to the SRSG that, without the presence of the NGOs, ICRC or other United Nations agencies in the area, the fate of these displaced would remain unknown. The Secretariat stressed that it was imperative that in any negotiations with the Serbs, access to these individuals be given priority.

Furthermore, the Dutch debriefing report indicates that several members of the Dutchbat independently saw corpses, or witnessed events on 13 July which gave rise to suspicions that potential grave abuses may have been committed. In addition to the 9-10 bodies which were found near a stream, one Dutchbat soldier witnessed, from a distance of approximately 200 metres, four BSA soldiers executing a male victim with a shot to the back of the head. This incident took place near the Poto...ari compound. Another Dutchbat soldier stated that he possibly witnessed the BSA execute two refugees near the main gate of the Poto...ari compound. Two more Dutchbat witnesses recounted having visited the white house in Poto...ari on 13 July to give water to the men that the BSA had placed there. These two Dutchbat soldiers recounted that the refugees were obviously terrified. They managed to take photographs of those refugees, but the Dutch debriefing report indicates that the film containing these images was rendered useless when it was developed. (No explanation was provided in this regard). The same film apparently contained photographs of the 9-10 dead bodies found near the stream. Several other Dutchbat personnel reported seeing the bodies of between one and five men lying on the road between Bratunac and Konjeviçi on 13 July, while they were escorting the convoys. Another Dutchbat soldier revealed that on 13 July he had observed what he estimated to be 1,000 Bosniac soldiers squatting in the football stadium to the north of Nova Kasaba. During that night, while in Nova Kasaba, he reported hearing a great deal of shooting from hand-held weapons in a northerly direction.

A number of the Dutchbat personnel appear to have communicated some of the acounts described above to UNPROFOR personnel when they arrived in Zagreb at the end of July, as well as during their debriefing back in the Netherlands. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, those accounts were included in the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council, on 22 August 1995 (E/CN.4/1996/9), as well as in the Secretary Generals reports to the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 1010, of 30 August 1995 (S/1995/755) and 27 November 1995 (S/1995/988). However, it appears that only a very limited number of the accounts in the above paragraph were formally reported up the UNPROFOR chain of command on 13 July, or the following day even though it appears that some of the Dutchbat personnel, who were not being held captive by the Serbs, may have had the means to do so at the time.

Thus, on 13 July, there was strong alarm expressed at various levels that abuses may have been or were being committed against the men of Srebrenica, but none had been confirmed to have taken place at that time. Efforts were nevertheless focused at the highest levels to try and address the situation.

On 13 July, the Secretariat provided the Secretary-Generals Special Envoy,

Mr. Stoltenberg, with instructions on how he was to proceed with his high-level negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, and if deemed appropriate, with the authorities in Belgrade. He was to try and negotiate a restoration of the safe area regime in Srebrenica, or if this was not possible, at least a continuing United Nations presence there. He was to negotiate the release of the United Nations personnel being detained and the restoration of their freedom of movement. He was also to obtain commitments for humane treatment of the refugees and displaced persons, in accordance with international humanitarian norms, and access for humanitarian convoys. As concerns the safe areas in general, he was also instructed to negotiate: an end to all BSA attacks on the safe areas; the definition of boundaries of the safe areas on the basis of maps prepared by UNPROFOR; demilitarization of the safe areas and freedom of movement for UNHCR and NGOs and access for humanitarian convoys. The Special Envoy was urged to coordinate closely with the SRSG and the European Union (EU) Negotiator, Mr. Bildt, who had just returned from a meeting of the Contact Group that was held on the matter the previous day in London, and who was thought to have been able to offer assistance through contact with the FRY authorities.

E.
14 July
-- mass executions commence; EU Negotiator meets with Miloševiç and Mladiç

It has since been learned that the Serbs began the systematic extermination of the thousands of Bosniac males being held in Bratunac in the early morning hours of 14 July. At that time, they began loading the Bosniacs into vehicles and transporting them to different locations in the wider area. Those locations turned out to be extermination sites, where there is strong evidence to suggest that all of those men were executed over the next two to three days (with the exception of a handful of individuals who survived by hiding under or among the dead bodies). Five of those locations were as follows (with the dates provided for when the executions are believed to have taken place):

One of the members of a unit participating in these executions, Drañen Erdemoviç (a Bosnian Croat who had enlisted in the BSA), surrendered himself to the Tribunal, and in 1996, provided it with detailed testimony of killings he himself participated in, or was aware of, at two of the execution sites: Branjevo Farm and the Pilica Cultural Centre. Erdemoviç belonged to the 10th Sabotage Unit based in Han Pijseak, the headquarters of the BSA. He recounted how the members of his unit were ordered on 16 July to go to a farm (Branjevo Farm) in the area of Pilica, though they were not initially told for what purpose. He then recounted how buses carrying Bosniac men began arriving at the farm, one by one, and how one of his commanding officers then ordered him and his unit to execute those people, to shoot them. He remembered between 15 and 20 buses in total arriving, carrying men between the ages of 17 and 70. The men on the first bus were blindfolded and their hands were tied. The rest were neither blindfolded nor were their hands tied.

Another group of soldiers reportedly from the Bratunac Brigade joined Erdemoviçs Unit as the buses were arriving. These soldiers proceeded to beat the civilians with bars. They forced them to kneel and to pray in the Muslim manner, to bow their heads, Erdemoviç continued. He concluded that they were attempting to humiliate these men before they were to be killed. Erdemoviç emphasized that he attempted to extricate himself from the killings that were about to take place, because, he stated, I was sorry for those people simply. I had no reason to shoot at those people. They had done nothing to me. He indicated that he nevertheless proceeded with the killings facing the option of his own death. Even the bus drivers, he pointed out, were ordered to kill at least one man each so that they could not testify. Erdemoviç believed that members of the 10th Sabotage Unit and elements from what he presumed to be the Bratunac Brigade, including himself, proceeded to line up between 1,000 to 1,200 men that day, on the farm near Pilica, and systematically kill them. When asked how many people he killed himself, Erdemoviç responded: I would rather not know how many people I killed. However, the killings were not over.

Erdemoviç recalled how after the executions had been carried out on the Branjevo Farm, one of his commanding officers said that there was still another group of about 500 Bosniac men being held in the Cultural Centre in Pilica. This time Erdemoviç managed to extricate himself from the killing, which appears to have been carried out by small arms fire and hand grenades thrown into the hall.

Erdemoviç told the Tribunal: I wanted to testify because of my conscience, because of all that happened because I did not want that. I was simply compelled to, forced to, and I could choose between my life and the life of those people; and had I lost my life then, that would not have changed the fate of those people. The fate of those people was decided by somebody holding a much higher position than I did. As I have said already, what really got me, I mean, it has completely destroyed my life and that is why I testified. It is worth bearing in mind that Erdemoviç, a Bosnian Croat, remains the only individual who participated in the executions from 14 to 17 July, who has surrendered himself. ICTY has reconstructed the crime scene from that period based on the forensic evidence which it has used to corroborate the stories of the handful of men who survived the executions.

The accounts of the survivors of the other execution sites are equally horrific. The horror for those being held in Bratunac had begun a few days earlier, on 14 July, when one group of men was loaded into buses and taken to a school near the Lazete Hamlet, where they were then jammed into a warehouse. Throughout the morning, the warehouse continued to be filled with men, until they were eventually taken out, given some water and told that they were to be exchanged. They were then put on trucks which took them 800 metres north of the school, taken off the trucks, lined up in a field, and shot.

Also on 14 July, another group was taken from Bratunac past Zvornik to Karakaj and the aluminium factory, and were dropped of at the Petkovski School. They were jammed into the schools gym and classrooms. During the course of the day, they were subjected to lethal beatings. In the afternoon and evening, people were placed in trucks and taken to the plateau of the dam of the aluminium factory (the Red Dam), and executed. Some of their bodies are believed to have been thrown in the lake, others piled into mass graves.

On or about 15 July, a group of approximately 450 people were taken from Bratunac to Kozluk, located on the Drina, north of Karakaj. They were all summarily executed, only a few hundred metres from the barracks of the Drina Wolves.

On 16 July, the column of Bosniac men that had set out from Srebrenica and Šušnjari was still trying to make its way to ARBiH-held territory. Many of these men surrendered and were apparently loaded on buses and trucks and taken to the Cerska Valley. One Srebrenica survivor later recalled realizing that he was walking on blood as he arrived there, and that one week later others passing through the Cerska valley could smell corpses. One-hundred-fifty bodies with their hands bound were subsequently found at a mass grave near this location.

Over the past four years, ICTY has been able to determine that those killed between 14 and 17 July were buried within 24-48 hours in mass graves in close proximity to the execution sites. In some cases, the victims were made to dig their own graves. In others, they were shot while standing in them. It appears that, over the course of the next several months, the bodies were taken out of the initial mass graves, and reburied in 33 different secondary sites. Each of these secondary sites is believed to contain the remains of between 80 and 180 bodies. ICTY has managed to probe each of those sites, and has fully exhumed seven of them. To date, ICTY has found the remains of approximately 2,000 victims from those sites which it has fully exhumed, of which the identities of roughly 30 have been determined thus far.

The international community does not appear to have had any evidence at the time that executions were taking place in such staggering numbers. In fact, almost all the individuals interviewed in the context of this report indicated that they simply did not expect, nor even imagine, the possibility of such barbarity. However, the Dutch debriefing report reveals that two Dutchbat soldiers, on their way back from Nova Kasaba to Bratunac on 14 July, had seen between 500 and 700 corpses on the roadside. However, the same report indicated that two other members of Dutchbat travelling in the same vehicle saw only a few corpses. No written record has been located indicating that Dutchbat made either account available to the UNPROFOR chain of command on 14 July, or in the days immediately thereafter. Thus, it is not clear how many bodies were there are the time, and if they were those of soldiers who had been in the column and had been killed in battle with the BSA, or those of defenseless individuals who had been summarily executed.

On 14 July, the European Union negotiator, Mr. Bildt, travelled to Belgrade to meet with President Miloševiç. The meeting took place in Dobanovci, the hunting lodge outside of Belgrade, where Mr. Bildt had met President Miloševiç and General Mladiç one week earlier. According to Mr. Bildts public account of that second meeting, he pressed the President to arrange immediate access for UNHCR to assist the people of Srebrenica, and for the ICRC to start to register those who were being treated by the BSA as prisoners of war. He also insisted that the Dutch soldiers be allowed to leave at their will. Mr. Bildt added that the international community would not tolerate an attack on Gorañde, and that a green light would have to be secured for free and unimpeded access to the enclaves. He also demanded that the road between Kiseljak and Sarajevo (Route Swan) be opened to all non-military transport. President Miloševiç apparently acceded to the various demands, but also claimed that he did not have control over the matter. Miloševiç had also apparently explained, earlier in the meeting, that the whole incident had been provoked by escalating Muslim attacks from the enclave, in violation of the 1993 demilitarization agreement.

A few hours into the meeting, General Mladiç arrived in Dobanovci. Mr. Bildt noted that General Mladiç readily agreed to most of the demands on Srebrenica, but remained opposed to some of the arrangements pertaining to the other enclaves, Sarajevo in particular. Eventually, with President Miloševiçs intervention, it appeared that an agreement in principle had been reached. It was decided that another meeting would be held the next day in order to confirm the arrangements. Mr. Bildt had already arranged with Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Akashi that they would join him in Belgrade. He also requested that the UNPROFOR Commander come to Belgrade as well in order to finalize some of the military details with Mladiç.

Meanwhile, the Security Council had again convened to discuss the situation in Srebrenica and had adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/1995/32) in which the President recalled resolution 1004 (1995) and expressed deep concern about the on-going forced relocation of tens of thousands of civilians from the Srebrenica safe area to the Tuzla region by the Bosnian Serbs. The Council considered this forced relocation to be a clear violation of the human rights of the civilian population. The President stated that the Council was especially concerned about reports that up to 4,000 men and boys had been forcibly removed by the Bosnian Serb party from the Srebrenica safe area. It demanded that, in conformity with internationally recognized standards of conduct and international law the Bosnian Serb party release them immediately, respect fully the rights of the civilian population of the Srebrenica safe area and other persons protected under international humanitarian law, and permit access by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

F.
15 July
-- massacres continue; agreement reached between Mladiç and UNPROFOR

The Co-Chairmen of ICFY, the SRSG, and the UNPROFOR Commander convened for a meeting at the United States Embassy in Belgrade on the morning of 15 July. Mr. Bildt briefed the gathering on the results of his meeting with Miloševiç and Mladiç the previous day. Aware of reports that grave human rights abuses may have occurred against the men and boys of Srebrenica, but unaware that mass and systematic executions had commenced, the gathering of senior international officials then joined Miloševiç and Mladiç for a largely ceremonial meeting over lunch. This was followed by a meeting between the UNPROFOR Commander and Mladiç to finalize the details.

In his account of these meetings, Mr. Bildt explains that the participants decided not to initially reveal publicly that the meeting had taken place, or to divulge the substance of any agreements reached. He explains that this decision was taken because the meeting with Mladiç was ostensibly taking place without Karadñiçs knowledge and that they did not want the latter to find out. (Mr. Bildt indicates that it had become part of a concerted effort to use Mladiç in order to undermine Karadñiç). Mr. Bildt adds that it was nevertheless decided that the provisions of the agreement relating to Srebrenica would take effect immediately, even if not officially signed, whereas the provisions relating to Gorañde, ðepa, Sarajevo and other matters would be finalized after another meeting between Mladiç and the UNPROFOR Commander, to be held in Serb-held territory outside of Sarajevo, at 1200 hours on 19 July. The second meeting would not be kept secret, and after its conclusion, all points agreed upon, including on Srebrenica, would then be revealed.

377. The points of agreement reached on Srebrenica, as reported to United Nations Headquarters at the time, were as follows:

As concerns the other matters, it was agreed in principle that UNHCR and UNPROFOR forces would be given freedom of movement to and from Gorañde and ðepa, via Belgrade-Visegrad. Normal traffic would be established to Sarajevo via the land corridor between Kiseljak - Sierra One -- and Ilidza.The UNPROFOR Commander maintained that he would continue to use the route over Mt. Igman whenever he deemed that the circumstances on the route via Kiseljak were unsatisfactory. The Serbs proposed that all generals commanding warring parties be invited, in the presence of Mr. Bildt, to discussions on a cessation of hostilities agreement. A meeting would be arranged for UNHCR with General Gvero, to take place at noon on 16 July, in Jahorina.

Shortly after the meeting, SRSG Akashis staff in Zagreb informed him that the BSA had released the Dutchbat soldiers being held hostage, and that they would be picked up the following day in Belgrade. Mr. Akashis staff also prepared an update on the situation as they knew it at that point. They wrote that 10,000 people were rumoured to be making their way through the forest, and that less than one-third of them were reportedly armed. They went on to state: We still have no clear idea where the Bosnian males in Srebrenica are. UNHCR has heard rumours that the men could now be in Bijeljina. The UNMOs have heard shots in the forest near Bratunac, suggesting that some of the men could have been shot. MSF is reporting massacres on the road between Bratunac and Kladanj, and this could explain the four buses which disappeared. The report confirmed that ICRC still had not obtained access to any of the missing men and boys.

Also by 15 July, UNPROFOR and UNHCR had started to resolve their differences with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the relocation of the displaced persons from Srebrenica. The SRSG reported to United Nations Headquarters in New York that there were 5,670 displaced being housed in roughly 720 tents at the Tuzla airbase. The Bosnian Government authorities had begun to arrange accommodation for another 11,000 displaced in various locations within the Tuzla Canton. Scores of other displaced persons were able to find accommodation with friends and relatives on their own. By 15 July, ICRC had registered a total of 19,700 women, children and elderly (and a very small number of military-aged men) as having passed through Kladanj from Poto...ari. UNPF estimated that up to 20,000 persons from Srebrenica, mainly military-aged men, remained unaccounted for. (UNPF added a note of caution, however, that the figure of those missing had been deduced from the enclaves total population, estimated by UNHCR at 42,000, which was assumed to be inflated, though it was not clear to what extent). UNPF indicated that the only reports received on these mens whereabouts to date was from MSF, which believed that some 700 males were being held in the football stadium in Bratunac.

Members of UNPROFORs Civil Affairs staff, representatives of the United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights and Refugees, ICRC, various non-governmental organizations and Member States, as well as members of the press, began interviewing the displaced persons who were gathered at the Tuzla air base and the surrounding areas as they arrived. They began to tell the stories of the killings they had witnessed, and the abductions and rapes of which they were aware. None of the survivors of the mass executions had yet made it to Tuzla, however. Meanwhile, the UNMOs reported that the BSA had now taken over their former headquarters in the PTT building in Srebrenica. The first group of Serb families were also now moving into the houses left vacant by the towns former inhabitants.

Amidst the growing concerns about the fate of the men of Srebrenica, the ongoing attack on ðepa and concerns of potential attacks on other safe areas, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called for a major international conference to be held in London, on 21 July, in order to decide on a strategy to address the crisis.

G.
16-18 July:
Mladiç still does not honor agreements related to Srebrenica; widespread reports of atrocities begin to surface;

The Dutchbat soldiers who had previously been held hostage in Serb-held areas, arrived in Zagreb on the afternoon of 16 July and returned to the Netherlands the following day. The following remained in Poto...ari awaiting relocation: 383 Dutchbat soldiers; 3 UNMOs; 6 UNPROFOR interpreters; two UNHCR local staff; 8 MSF staff; 2 representatives from the refugees (who had accompanied the Dutchbat Commander to negotiate with Mladiç the third had been handed over to the BSA on 13 July, and remained unaccounted for); and approximately 88 wounded local inhabitants.

On 16 July, a convoy from the Norwegian Logistics Battalion based in Tuzla attempted to cross through Serb-held territory to Poto...ari, in order to pick-up the remaining wounded at the Dutchbat compound. The convoy was forced to turn back after being fired upon by the BSA. The BSA also hijacked a Dutchbat convoy between Bratunac and Zvornik, confiscating the vehicle, weapons and equipment of the crew. It was not until 17-18 July that the ICRC was able to gain access to the wounded being held in Poto...ari and Bratunac. They were able to evacuate 65 of them to safety, but the BSA detained the remaining 23 as prisoners of war. ICRC was able to note their identify and whereabouts. At the same time, the BSA continued to deny access to the thousands of men whose whereabouts remained unaccounted for. It also pressured the Deputy Battalion Commander of Dutchbat and a representative of the Bosniac civilians in Srebrenica to co-sign a declaration indicating that the evacuation of the population of Srebrenica had been conducted according to international humanitarian law. The Dutchbat officer concerned has since categorically rejected the validity of the Declaration. He has stated that his signature (and that of the Bosniac representative) was solicited under duress, and that, in any event, it only applied to those convoys which United Nations personnel had escorted, as indicated in the hand-written notation which he insisted be inserted in the text.

Late in the evening of 16 July and early morning hours of 17 July, some 4,500 to 6,000 from the column of men and boys who had fled Srebrenica through the woods, crossed into ARBiH-controlled territory in the southern Sapna area.

Interviewed in the context of this report, some of the Bosniacs who survived the six day march through the forest explained how, having passed the first Serb cordon, they encountered a second cordon near the village of Krizaviçi. Several hours of intense fighting had taken place, but they had managed to press on. Heavy rain and hail had provided some additional cover as the column passed through the municipality of Zvornik . As the column of Bosniac men approached the main Serb-Federation confrontation line, they had attacked a Serb command post, capturing two tanks and a 20-mm Praga gun. Using the captured tanks and guns, the Bosniacs then crossed the first of three lines of Serb trenches. They then signaled forward to the Federation, hoping that the ARBiH 2nd Corps would launch an operation to hold down or divert Serb forces as they attempted to cross the confrontation line. The 2nd Corps did not mount any such diversionary attacks. However, Srebrenicas former commander, Naser Oriç, had assembled a company of volunteers on Federation territory. When Oriç and his men ascertained the location at which the Srebrenica men would try to cross the Serb lines, they attacked the area, causing the Serbs to partially evacuate their forward trenches. This left only limited Serb positions between the column of men and Oriçs fighters. The men in the column were ordered to use all their remaining ammunition on this last line of Serb defense, including rounds which were being held in reserve for suicide in the event of capture. They broke through the Serb lines and reached ARBiH territory.

The following day, many of these men began arriving in the Tuzla area, searching for their families. The Bosnian Government disarmed the survivors and transported them to collective shelters in the wider area of Tuzla. Members of UNPROFOR were able to interview a number of them, and report their accounts to the missions leadership. The men interviewed estimated that up to 3,000 of the 12,000 to 15,000 in the column had either been killed during combat with the BSA or when crossing over mines, while an undetermined number among them had also surrendered to the BSA. They did not know if the latter were still alive or where they were being held. A number had also committed suicide. These estimates suggested, very roughly, that between 4,000 to 7,500 of the men and boys in the column were still unaccounted for.

As of 17 July, the BSA continued to refuse to honour the agreements related to Srebrenica which Mladiç had entererd into in Belgrade two days earlier. The SRSG reported to New York that day that the status and location of unaccounted for persons and possible detainees, especially draft-age males, remains a large gap in our database. Unconfirmed reports provide accounts of detention centres, execution-style murder, rapes of young women, and other atrocities. As wider access to the area has not yet been granted by the BSA, it may be useful to continue, or even intensify, public and media attention on this issue...It is important not to allow momentum to dissipate on this issue, otherwise many thousands of lives may well be in danger.

The same day, one of the Dutchbat soldiers, during his brief stay in Zagreb upon return from Serb-held territory, was quoted as telling a member of the press that hunting season [is] in full swing...it is not only men supposedly belonging to the Bosnian government who are targeted...women, including pregnant ones, children and old people arent spared. Some are shot and wounded, others have had their ears cut-off and some women have been raped.

The story was picked up by a number of wire services and reproduced. At approximately the same time, survivors of executions had also begun to recount their testimonies to the international and local press.

This prompted the Secretariat to write to the SRSG the following day: you will, no doubt, have read and heard the extensive reports of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs during their recent takeover of Srebrenica. While many of these reports emerge from refugees, they are widespread and consistent, and have been given credence by a variety of international observers, including UNHCR. We have however, received nothing on the subject from UNPROFOR. The Secretariat urged the SRSG to ensure that UNPROFOR interview the Dutch personnel who had already returned from Srebrenica. The instruction to the SRSG continued: our inability to corroborate (or authoritatively contradict) any of the allegations currently being made, many of which involve events of which UNPROFOR in Poto...ari could not have been unaware, is causing mounting concern here. The SRSG responded that the Dutchbat soldiers that had been in Bratunac had been debriefed immediately upon arrival in Zagreb. He added, however, that such debriefings did not reveal any first-hand accounts of human rights violations.

H.
19 July
-- Mladiç and UNPROFOR Commander meet again and conclude agreement

Based on his recent meeting with President Miloševiç and General Mladiç in Belgrade, Mr. Akashi was hopeful that both might feel it opportune to show some generosity. He sought the views of the UNPROFOR Commander, who responded that peacekeeping [had] come to an end, and that the safe area policy had manifestly failed. In his view, the war would continue for some time, until there was symmetry in the territorial holdings of the belligerents. He felt that this symmetry might emerge as time was not on the side of the Bosnian Serbs, whom he predicted would become relatively weaker as the months wore on. He warned that the Serbs would seek a ceasefire which would seal their territorial gains.

The UNPROFOR Commander met with Mladiç on 19 July at the Restoran Jela in Serb-held territory outside of Sarajevo. Throughout the meeting, he maintained contact with Mr. Bildt, who was holding parallel negotiations with President Miloševiç in Belgrade. The UNPROFOR Commander again stressed to Mladiç how essential it was that ICRC be granted immediate access to the men being detained, and that freedom of movement to the enclaves be restored for UNPROFOR and UNHCR. He pressed Mladiç to explain his troops behaviour in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica, to which Mladiç responded that his troops had finished [it] in a correct way. Mladiç added that on the night of 10-11 July, a significant number of ARBiH troops had broken through the confrontation line in the direction of Tuzla. Mladiç continued that he had opened a corridor to let these troops go. He accepted that some skirmishes had taken place with casualties on both sides, and that some unfortunate small incidents had occurred. The UNPROFOR Commander and Mladiç then signed the agreement which provided for the following:

Subsequent to the signing of this agreement, the SRSG wrote to President Miloševiç, reminding him of the agreement that had not yet been honored, to allow ICRC access to Srebrenica. The SRSG later also telephoned President Miloševiç to reiterate the same point.

393. During the meeting, Mladiç claimed triumphantly that ðepa had fallen to advancing Serb forces. This, however, was untrue, and the situation on the ground in ðepa was complex.