First Net Print, November 23 1999
Second Net Print, November 25 1999
Third Net Print, October 30 2001

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 53/35 (1998)

VII.
THE FALL OF SREBRENICA:
6-11 JULY 1995

The United Nations has hitherto not publicly disclosed the full details of the attack on Srebrenica from 6-11 July 1995. The account which follows has now been reconstructed mainly from reports filed at that time by Dutchbat and the UNMOs. The accounts provided have also been supplemented with information contained in the Netherlands Report on the Debriefing of the Dutchbat, completed in October 1995, and by information provided by Bosniac, Serb and international sources. In order to independently examine the information contained in various secondary sources published over the past four years, as well to corroborate key information contained in the Netherlands Debriefing Report, interviews were conducted during the preparation of this report with a number of key personnel who were either in Srebrenica at the time, or who were involved in decision-making at higher levels in the United Nations chain of command.

A.
6 July 1995
-- Attack on OP-Foxtrot and shelling of Srebrenica; request for Close Air Support discouraged; ARBiH request for access to weapons turned down

The BSA launched their attack on Srebrenica in the early morning hours of 6 July. Fighting took place at a number of points on the perimeter of the enclave, and shells exploded at various locations within the enclave. The main axis of attack, however, was from the south. Five rockets impacted within 300 metres of the Dutchbat headquarters in Poto...ari shortly after 0300 hours. An hour later, B Company reported heavy firing between Serbs and Bosniacs in the Bandera triangle. At 0434 hours, the BSA launched artillery attacks on several Bosniac positions within the enclave, followed by an exchange of small arms fire. By 0500 hours, OP Hotel reported the presence of BSA tanks to its south-east. Shortly after, OP Foxtrot, at the southeastern edge of the enclave, reported that the BSA had fired tank rounds at a nearby ARBiH position. Tank rounds had impacted within 100 metres of the Dutch position. Firing continued and two further tank rounds impacted between the OP and the ARBiH position. By the morning of 6 July, Dutchbat was facing the worst attack on the enclave during its deployment.

Ramiz Beçiroviç, acting-Commander of Bosniac forces in Srebrenica, asked the UNPROFOR Battalion Commander to give the Bosniacs back the weapons they had surrendered as part of the demilitarization agreements of 1993, but this request was refused. One of the Dutchbat Commanders superiors, with whom he consulted on this decision, has since stated that he supported the decision not to hand back the weapons, because it was UNPROFORs responsibility to defend the enclave, and not theirs...We didnt want to escalate the situation further by bringing the BSA and ARBiH into direct fighting. Serb firing continued. At 0800 hours, OP Delta reported that several M-30 rounds had been fired to their northeast, though they could not confirm where they had landed. Over the next four hours Dutchbat recorded BSA shells landing at various locations, though mainly in the south-eastern, eastern and northern parts of the enclave.

OP Foxtrot was directly targeted by a Serb tank at 1255 hours, with one round impacting on the defence wall of the observation post. At about the same time, Dutchbat also reported that one civilian had been killed and another seriously wounded when two Serb shells impacted near the road between Poto...ari and Srebrenica. As these events were unfolding, the Dutchbat Commander telephoned reports through to Sector Northeast headquarters in Tuzla and to UNPROFORs BH Command in Sarajevo.

UNPROFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo informed UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb that there had been sporadic shelling and firing in the southern part of the enclave, and that several shells had impacted close to a collective centre for refugees. Shortly after 1300 hours, Dutchbat HQ went to alert state Red, and personnel were ordered to the bunkers. At 1320 hours, a BSA tank-round hit the watchtower of OP Foxtrot causing considerable damage. At 1340 hours, two BSA tank-rounds fired directly at OP Foxtrot narrowly missed.

Some time between 1300 and 1400 hours, the Dutchbat Commander verbally requested the deployment of close air support in response to the direct attack on OP Foxtrot to his immediate superior, the acting-Commander of Sector Northeast (Tuzla), (coincidentally from the Netherlands). Sector Northeast approved the request and verbally passed it on to UNPROFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, the next level in the chain of command. As the UNPROFOR Commander was absent on leave during these events, the UNPROFOR Deputy Commander and Head of Sector Sarajevo (France) was the ranking UNPROFOR officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the majority of communication between UNPROFOR BH Command and Dutchbat during the crisis was handled by the UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff (Netherlands). The UNPROFOR Chief of Staff discouraged the request because, as he has since explained, he did not believe that the Force Commanders criteria on the use of air power, which in his view were very restrictive (to be used only as a last resort), had been met. His superiors in Zagreb, the Chief of Land Operations, and the Force Commanders Chief of Staff (both of whom were also from the Netherlands), apparently concurred with this assessment, during this stage of the attack.

UNPROFORs position in the enclave continued to deteriorate during the early afternoon. At 1410 hours, the BSA again fired two tank rounds at the OP, narrowly missing it. At 1432 hours, two heavy weapons located near OP Papa aimed their barrels at the Dutchbat compound in Poto...ari. At 1442 hours, three rounds fired by the BSA tank impacted within 50 metres of OP Foxtrot. Shortly after, however, the BSA shelling of the safe area and the direct targeting of United Nations personnel stopped. There had been no close air support, and UNPROFOR had not returned fire at the BSA. Bosniac units had exchanged small arms fire with the BSA, though to what extent could not be determined.

As night fell on Srebrenica, the United Nations Secretariat in New York was holding a pre-scheduled meeting in New York with the representatives of troop contributing countries. The discussion focused predominantly on the role that the Rapid Reaction Force was to play and the difficulties that had been encountered to date in making it operational. Word of the BSA attack on the safe area had not yet reached New York. As a result, no mention was made of it by either the Secretariat representatives or by the representatives of troop contributing countries.

B.
7 July
-- temporary pause in the Serb attack

In his report to the Secretariat on the events of 6 July, the SRSG noted that the Bosniac commander in Srebrenica had called on UNPROFOR to return the weapons held by it as part of the demilitarization agreement. The SRSG added that this is an issue which may well need to be resolved in the near future given the impossibility [for] UNPROFOR to defend the safe area. The Srebrenica offensive, with its direct targeting of UNPROFOR positions, also raises the question of the utility of maintaining troops in situations in which they are also unable to defend themselves, at least until the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force. (The Rapid Reaction Force was not operational at that time, due to restrictions imposed upon its deployment by the Bosniac-Croat Federation).

As the crisis in Srebrenica was emerging, Mr. Bildt was proceding with his efforts to restart the political process. In this regard, he met in Belgrade with President Miloševiç and General Mladiç on 7 July. In the context of the present report, Mr. Bildt recalled having conveyed his concerns to both of them about the deteriorating situation around Sarajevo and the desparate supply situation in the eastern enclaves. He urged the Serbs to exercise restraint in their activities and to give the political process a chance. Mr. Bildt did not specifically address the Serb attack upon Srebrenica, however, because he was not aware at the time of the seriousness of what had transpired.

Furthermore, for most of the day on 7 July, the situation on the ground in Srebrenica was relatively quiet, partly due to poor weather. At approximately 1800 hours, however, the BSA fired sixteen artillery shells into the urban population centre of Srebrenica, close to the B Company compound. A few hours later, Sector Northeast reported to UNPROFOR and UNPF Headquarters that the situation in Srebrenica remained tense. It also reported that BSA tanks had fired 10 rounds at the electricity plant 200 metres southwest of the Dutchbatt compound in Poto...ari. It was estimated that BSA shelling inside the enclave had now killed four civilians and wounded seventeen others. A total of 287 detonations (presumed to be incoming fire from the BSA) and 21 from outgoing fire by the ARBiH had been recorded.

At the end of the day, the Dutchbat Commander conveyed his assessment of the situation to Sector Northeast. He felt that the Drina Corps had been ordered to strengthen its position around the enclave, with the possible aim of precipitating a reduction of UN troops in Srebrenica. He further assessed that the Drina Corps was seeking to increase its ability to either eliminate or neutralize Bosniac forces in the enclave. He added that the BSA would not be able to conquer the enclave in the short-term due to its limited manpower, but, in the long-term, would indeed be able to neutralize the ARBiH. He summarized that, over the past days, the BSA had started to shell urban areas, and had openly and deliberately attacked UNPROFOR and ARBiH positions. He also repeated his concerns about the lack of supplies entering the enclave, both for Dutchbat and for the population. He surmised that the scheduled troop rotation of Dutchbat out of the enclave would now be rejected by the BSA. He concluded with an appeal on behalf of the population of the enclave of Srebrenica, asking for assistance by all means: ground and air. It does not appear that either the text or summary of it was conveyed to UNPFs leadership.

C.
8 July
-- Request for Close Air Support discouraged again; BSA over-runs OP-Foxtrot; ARBiH kill Dutchbatt soldier; BSA surrounds two other OPs;

The Serbs made a substantial advance into the safe area of Srebrenica on 8 July. Shortly after 1100 hours, the firing began to focus on OP Foxtrot. At 1126 hours, B Company reported that the Serbs were firing from a T-54/55 tank, and that two rounds had struck Bosniac positions approximately 200 metres in front of OP Foxtrot. At 1226 hours, the BSA fired a tank round and several howitzer rounds at Bosniac positions in front of OP Foxtrot. At 1325 hours, OP Foxtrot reported that the fighting between Bosniacs and Serbs in its vicinity was extremely tense and that it could no longer continue with its observation tasks in light of the security risks. Less than ten minutes later, the post reported that the tension had reached its height, culminating with the direct impact of a tank round and three shells on the defence wall of the OP, which had caused considerable damage.

Meanwhile, a sporadic bombardment of the rest of the enclave was continuing. At 0842 hours, two shells had impacted in the centre of Srebrenica town. At 1242 hours, two mortar or artillery rounds impacted within 100 metres of the Bravo Company Headquarters in Srebrenica, causing the Company commander to issue a Bunker Alarm. From 1245 hours until 1307 hours, the BSA again fired numerous artillery and mortar rounds at several locations throughout the enclave. This was followed by an almost immediate exchange of fire between the BSA and the ARBiH. At 1313 hours, OP Hotel reported that a Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) had fired at least two rockets in the direction of Srebrenica, one of which had impacted near the town. Between 1315 hours and1325 hours the BSA continued to shell the northern, eastern and southern portions of the enclave.

During the early afternoon, the Dutchbat Commander appears to have spoken to the UNPROFOR Chief of Staff in Sarajevo, again requesting close air support in response to the attack on OP Foxtrot. As before, the Chief of Staff discouraged the request, favouring instead the option to withdraw the personnel from the post. His immediate superiors in UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb appear to have concurred with the decision. It appears that the assessment made in both Sarajevo and Zagreb at the time was that, although they had crossed the Morillon Line (the negotiated boundary) into the safe area, the BSA did not intend to overrun the whole enclave, but only to take control of strategic ground in the southern portion of the enclave.

At 1359 hours, a Serb tank crossed the Bosniac trenches close to OP Foxtrot. Prior to this, Bosniac fighters evacuated the trench line, assuming new positions approximately 100 metres behind OP Foxtrot. The Serb tank stopped 100 metres in front of OP Foxtrot, and fired to the west of the OP. At 1407 hours, the BSA fired small arms, grenades and mortars at the ARBiH positions, to which the ARBiH responded with small arms fire. The TOW anti-tank missile on the top of OP-Foxtrot was inoperative, and had been further damaged in the shelling of the previous days. The OP personnel did, however, have a functioning AT-4 shoulder-launched anti-tank rocket, which could have been used to fire at the BSA tank in front of them. The B Company commander assessed, however, that if the OP opened fire on the BSA, it would have escalated the tension and possibly rendered impossible their withdrawal from the area, not to mention risk the lives of his crew, who had nowhere to take cover in the face of direct tank fire. Accordingly, the Company commander, with the concurrence of the Dutchbat Commander, ordered the personnel in OP-Foxtrot not to return fire but to withdraw instead.

Two Serb soldiers entered OP Foxtrot unopposed at 1426 hours and after a few minutes were joined by several others. The BSA ordered the crew of OP Foxtrot to leave the post, and to leave behind their weapons and flack-jackets. The UNPROFOR soldiers were ultimately allowed to keep their flack-jackets but not their weapons. At 1445 hours, the Serbs allowed the crew to depart the area in its APC. At 1450 hours, as the APC was withdrawing, they encountered three armed ARBiH soldiers blocking the road. The APC radioed the B Company commander for further instructions. The commander ordered the APC to proceed through the obstacle, provided that the Bosniacs did not appear to have anti-tank weapons. As the APC moved forward, however, one of the Bosniacs fired at the APC, striking the one crew member who was still exposed in the head. The wound proved fatal.

Having overrun OP Foxtrot, the Serbs began concentrating their fire around

OPs Sierra and Uniform, the next two OPs in the line of advance. There was sporadic shelling of the southern part of the enclave from 1600 to 1700 hours and Bosniacs and Serbs exchanged fire for more than three hours on the hills above OP Uniform. Serb mortar rounds exploded in the vicinity of OP Uniform on several occasions. B Company instructed the crew to withdraw. BSA infantry occupied the hill crest behind OP Uniform at approximately 1830 hours, and shortly afterwards 20 to 30 BSA soldiers took over the OP. The Dutchbat personnel were forced to surrender all equipment, and were given a choice between returning to Srebrenica or accompanying the BSA personnel to Bosnian-Serb held territory. The OP crew later explained that, at the first bend on their retreat route, they saw five Bosniac soliders, all of whom appeared to be in possession of anti-tank weapons. They chose not to go back to Srebrenica, fearing a repetition of the episode that had occurred several hours earlier when OP Foxtrot withdrew.

As they were being taken by the BSA to Bosnian Serb-held territory, the crew of OP Uniform passed a message from the BSA to B Company and to OP Sierra: OP Sierra had better remain in position, it is too dangerous to move as not all Bosniac personnel have left. That night, the BSA forced the OP Uniform crew to move to Bratunac. They reported that they were to be accommodated in a hotel overnight, and that the Bosnian Serbs would permit them to leave for the Netherlands. They reported later that evening that they had reached Bratunac and that they were being well treated.

At the end of the day on 8 July, UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo sent a detailed report to UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb on the days events in Srebrenica. The report stated that OP Foxtrot had fallen, that one Dutchbat soldier died as a result of Bosniac fire on the APC, that the BSA had overrun OP Uniform and its personnel had been taken to Bratunac in Serb-held territory, and that OP Sierra was surrounded. It also indicated that it appeared that the BSA had cut off the southern junction of the enclave, but it was unclear how far the Serbs had penetrated into the safe area. It recounted unconfirmed reports that the object of the BSA was to limit the size of the enclave to better control it, and that this was in response to the casualties they had incurred in the past months due to Bosniac attacks. There were also reports that military and civilian personnel within the enclave had begun to gather around the B Company compound in Srebrenica. The report concluded that the situation was expected to remain very tense.

As the attack on Srebrenica was going on, the situation around the other safe areas was also unsettled. UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo reported that the BSA had targeted an UNPROFOR Observation Post in ðepa with tank and mortar fire during the day, damaging one APC but causing no casulaties. It also reported that four unidentified aircraft had overflown the area. At the request of the local Bosniac commander, the Ukrainian Company had handed over the Bosniac weapons it was holding pursuant to the demilitarization agreements of 1993. It was assessed that the BSA threats in ðepa were cause for concern and that the situation there appeared to be deteriorating. UNPROFOR also reported that that the BSA had launched what were believed to be probing attacks near Bihaç, and that there was a slight increase in military activity in Gorañde. Targetting of United Nations vehicles on the Igman route near Sarajevo also continued, with the BSA repeatedly using 30 mm cannon and other weapons against UNPROFOR. The ARBiH also apparently targeted United Nations vehicles on the Igman route three times on 6 and 7 July. There were no casualties as a result of any of these attacks and no return fire by UNPROFOR troops.

As the events of 8 July were unfolding on the ground, the Secretary-General convened a pre-scheduled meeting in Geneva with the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Special Representatives for the former Yugoslavia, the UNPF Force Commander and the UNPROFOR Commander (who was recalled from his leave to attend the meeting), his Special Political Advisor, and the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs.

At no point during that meeting was there any discussion about the ongoing BSA attack on Srebrenica nor was any assessment made that the BSA were planning to overrun the enclaves. The meeting discussed the issues for which it had been convened, namely to provide the Secretary-General with a strategic stock-taking of the situation on the ground and the prospects for the future. The Force Commander assessed that the Serbs were holding all the cards and that the United Nations deployment in the enclaves translated into 900 potential hostages to be taken. He feared that the United Nations was severely constrained in the enclaves. He reported that none of the OPs were manned any longer in Gorañde. He stressed the need to open the route over Mt. Igman to re-supply Sarajevo, and for the Rapid Reaction Force, when operational, to protect the humanitarian convoys -- though he cautioned against its more robust application in favour of minimizing the risk of escalation, placing emphasis on Mr. Bildts current peacemaking efforts.

The High Commissioner for Refugees gave the Secretary-General a very bleak assessment of the humanitarian situation. She indicated that during the month of June 1995, only 20 percent of the assessed needs had been met in Bosnia and Herzegovina, except in the contiguous Federation areas. Sarajevo had only received 8 percent of its assessed requirements. The airlift remained suspended since 8 April and soldiers had taken over driving the humanitarian trucks over Mt. Igman into Sarajevo, since it had become too dangerous for civilians. She stressed the need for greater involvement of the military in providing humanitarian assistance in light of the deteriorating security situation. The meeting concluded with a sense that if there were no breakthroughs on the peacemaking front in the immediate future, the United Nations would have to consider withdrawing from Bosnia.

D.
9 July
-- Events leading to the establishment of a Blocking Position and warning to the Serbs

None of the UNPF senior leadership gathered together in Geneva on 8 July had yet been informed of the seriousness of the events in Srebrenica. Based on the research conducted in the context of the present report, it appears that the leadership first learned about the extent of the deteriorating situation from UNPF Headquarters on the telephone at 0840 hours on 9 July. The assessment provided to them by the Military Information cell indicated that the BSA might be attempting to shrink the pocket. Upon receiving this report, the SRSG delegated his authority for the use of close air support to the Force Commander, who immediately left for Zagreb. The SRSG also returned to Zagreb later that day, and the Deputy Force Commander reported to him that the situation had stabilized. An aide also confirmed that no request for close air support had been thus far been received in Zagreb (which was technically true, as the requests that had been made up to that point had been turned down in Sarajevo).

That afternoon, on 9 July, the UNMOs in Sector Northeast provided an assessment of the situation in Srebrenica. Their report indicated that the Dutchbat OPs and personnel had been directly targeted, that the Dutchbat commander had refused to release the ARBiH weapons when requested, and that the Dutchbats soldiers did not have the capacity to control the situation and prevent advances into the enclave, adding that this has left the civilian population, the ARBiH and Dutchbat at the direct mercy of the BSA. The report offered 5 possible explanations for the BSAs attack on Srebrenica:

The UNMO report concluded with an assessment that the BSA offensive will continue until they achieve their aims. These aims may even be widening since the UN response has been almost non-existent and the BSA are now in a position to overrun the enclave if they wish. Documents later obtained from Serb sources appear to suggest that this assessment was correct. Those documents indicate that the Serb attack on Srebrenica initially had limited objectives. Only after having advanced with unexpected ease, did the Serbs decide to overrun the entire enclave. Serb civilian and military officials from the Srebrenica area have stated the same thing, adding, in the course of discussions with a United Nations official, that they decided to advance all the way to Srebrenica town when they assessed that UNPROFOR was not willing or able to stop them.

Serb soldiers entered OP Uniform at approximately 0900 hours on the morning of 9 July, and disarmed the crew. Roughly half an hour later, the BSA forced the crew to drive to the former OP Echo, which the BSA had taken over in early June. Along the way, the crew was able to observe and report that hills on the eastern side of the enclave were occupied by BSA artillery positions. The BSA then ordered the UNPROFOR crew to drive to Bratunac, where it arrived at approximately 1200 hours. The crew radioed Dutchbat in Srebrenica, reporting that the Serbs had told them that they would be evacuated to the Netherlands.

At about the same time, the UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff called General Tolimir at BSA Main Headquarters. The former acknowledged that the Dutchbat soldiers being held had been well treated, but also insisted that those soldiers being held in Bratunac be allowed to return to Poto...ari as soon as possible. Tolimir responded that he would convey the proposal to his subordinates on the ground, and expressed his condolences for the death of the Dutchbat crew member the previous day. Tolimir also indicated that he would instruct his subordinates regarding the means by which the deceaseds body could be evacuated via Serb-held territory as expeditiously as possible.

As these events were taking place, the estimated 3,000 residents of the Swedish Shelter Project, which was located near the southern perimeter of the enclave, began fleeing towards Srebrenica town. The Dutchbat Commander ordered B Company to establish a temporary OP near the refugee compound, which would then serve as Dutchbats southernmost position. B Company dispatched an APC to the area, where it arrived at approximately 1100 hours, passing a column of refugees streaming north. The five man APC crew reported upon arrival at the compound that it was virtually empty. At 1348 hours, the crew reported that they had been stopped and caught by surprise by a group of between fifteen and twenty BSA soldiers. The Serbs disarmed the crew, took their vehicle, and made them walk to Serb-held territory.

At about the same time, the Serbs began to attack OP Kilo, in the south of the enclave. At 1358 hours, the crew of OP Kilo reported that there was heavy fighting between the Bosniacs and Serbs to their south. Less than two hours later, OP Mike, which was on the opposite side of the enclave in the north-west, reported that the BSA had also opened fire on them, with three mortar rounds having landed just in front of their location. They then left the OP and moved to an area with greater cover, approximately 1 km away. Between 1600 and 1700, yet another Observation Post, OP Delta, reported that it, too, was now under fire.

The five Dutchbat personnel who had been captured near the refugee compound radioed back to the Battalion at 1700 hours, reporting that they had arrived in Bratunac. They had been transported by the Serbs, having initially set off on foot. They, like the other Dutchbat personnel from OPs Sierra and Uniform, reported that the BSA hold told them that they would be able to leave for the Netherlands the next day, via Belgrade.

As this was taking place, the Force Commander, who had been briefed throughout the day on the developments in Srebrenica, instructed UNPROFOR to assemble target information for close air support, if needed. This was done immediately. He also telephoned General Tolimir of the BSA. Tolimir claimed that the Dutch were not prisoners of war, but had simply requested the BSAs assistance, and were free to leave.

Shortly thereafter, the UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff again telephoned Tolimir, expressing concern about the situation that was developing in Srebrenica. He told Tolimir that the BSA troops had penetrated 4 kms into the enclave and were now only 1 km from the town of Srebrenica. He considered this to be an attack on the safe area, and said that UNPROFOR would be forced to defend it with all means. He demanded an explanation of the BSAs actions and requested that they withdraw to at least 4 km south of their present location, back to the recognized former confrontation line. Tolimir contended that the situation on the ground was not as had been presented and tried to focus on the discussions related to the return of the Dutchbat personnel being held. The UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff returned to the main point that UNPROFOR would be forced to defend the safe area, particularly since it had not given the ARBiH back the weapons it had deposited at the collection point under the terms of the 1993 demilitarization agreements. Tolimir claimed that he would check the situation and would report back in 30 minutes, which he did not.

While this conversation was ongoing, the BSA over-ran OP Delta and disarmed its crew. The BSA offered them a choice of returning to Srebrenica or being taken to the nearby Serb-held town of Miliçi. After discussion with their commander, they chose the latter option. Thus, by the evening of 9 July, 30 Dutchbat soldiers were now being held in Serb-held territory and the BSA had advanced 4 km deep into the safe area, just 1 km south of Srebrenica town.

The Force Commander conferred with the SRSG in Zagreb at 1800 hours. Based on the advice of their military staff, they decided that Dutchbat should establish a blocking position against the Serb approach to the town from the south. The Force Commander expected that the blocking position would fire upon the Serbs if attacked, and that close air support would also be requested in the event of such an attack. In connection with this, the Acting-UNPROFOR Commander in Sarajevo fowarded to the Force Commander a written request for close air support, with related target information. It was this request, the only one received in Zagreb up until then, that remained as a standing request throughout the remaining period of the Serb attack on Srebrenica. The SRSG and the Force Commander decided to demand that the Serb offensive on Srebrenica be stopped, that the BSA withdraw to the enclave boundary, and that the BSA also immediately release all Dutchbat personnel and their equipment.

Both the Force Commander and the UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff communicated these decisions to General Tolimir by telephone. During his conversation with Tolimir, the UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff added that he would shortly convey the same warning in writing. Tolimir confirmed that he understood the message, yet still refused to acknowledge that the Serbs had attacked UNPROFOR or the enclave. He claimed that Serb forces had done no more than take a portion in the south of the enclave from which the Bosniacs had allegedly been attacking, attempting to establish a link with ðepa. He insisted that the ARBiH had violated the demilitarization agreement. The UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff stated that the only party using heavy weapons was the BSA, and that it had indeed directly attacked the safe area and United Nations personnel, and had threatened the civilian population of Srebrenica. He concluded the conversation with a demand that if the BSA troops did not withdraw to the former confrontation line within two hours, UNPOROFOR would be forced to respond with all available means.

The written version of the warning was faxed to Tolimir shortly thereafter. It characterized the BSA actions as an attack on the safe area and summarized the extent of the attack in some detail. It concluded that the Dutch Battalion has been ordered to establish a blocking position to the south of the town. The SRSG and the FC have decided that if this blocking position is attacked by BSA forces, NATO CAS [close air support] will be employed. Given that the Serbs subsequently endeavoured to bypass the UNPROFOR blocking position on their way towards Srebrenica, it is possible that this message had given the Serbs the impression that air power would only be used to protect UNPROFOR, and that they could attack the Bosniacs with impunity.

The Force Commander communicated the details of what had transpired to his NATO counterpart, and it was agreed that NATO planes would be available at 0600 hours the following morning to respond to a request for close air support if received. Meanwhile, as the arrangements for the provision of close air support were being made, the Dutchbat Commander in Srebrenica, who had earlier favoured its use, changed his assessment in light of the extent to which the BSA had now advanced. He reported that using CAS in all possible ways is in my opinion not feasible. He believed that the BSA would respond with a barrage of artillery fire from the north, which could not be stopped unless all their weapons system could be eliminated simultaneously, which was unlikely. Concering BSA intentions, he remained uncertain as to whether the Serbs intended to overrun the entire enclave, or simply to secure the southern portion of it, which they had nearly completed. The Dutchbat Commander has since stated that he also expressed his strong reservations about the decision to establish a blocking position, which in his view, would not be able to stop a concerted Serb attack. He nevertheless carried out his instructions.

E.
10 July
-- BSA violates warning; use of Close Air Support deferred

B Company began establishing the blocking position in the early morning hours of 10 July. It gathered approximately 50 soldiers, six APCs, as well as the weaponry available to them, with the purpose of establishing fixed positions on each of the four approach routes to the town. These were designated as B1, B2, B3 and B4. The broader roads would be blocked by two APCs each (B1 and B3); the other two narrower routes would be blocked by one APC each (B2 and B4). The weapons collectively at their disposal were two drago medium-range anti-tank weapons, and a number of AT4 short-range anti-tank weapons, along with the .50 calibre heavy machine guns mounted on top of each of the APCs. The B Company Commander instructed the commanders of each of these four units that, if attacked, they should not fire directly at the BSA at first, but fire warning shots around the targets. However, if the BSA persisted with the attack, they should engage them in direct combat if necessary. All the same, they assumed that one or two APCs sitting on the route would not be able to stop a concerted attack from all directions. Forward Air Controllers (FACs) were deployed with one of the blocking positions, B1, and at OP Hotel, which was located on high ground next to Srebrenica town, from where they had a reasonably clear view of the area.

By approximately 0500 hours, B Company had been able to put in place three of the four blocking positions (B1, B3 and B4), but had not yet established B2, which was to be the one closest to the town. The Bosniacs in the area apparently thought that the APC en route to take up its position was in fact withdrawing, and became aggressive towards its crew. Thus, B2 took up a position further away from the town sometime between 0500 and 0700 hours. Shortly after 0700 hours, the Deputy Commander of B Company, who was in charge of all four blocking positions, was conducting a reconnaissance of each of his positions. A loud detonation was felt as the APC proceeded towards the B2 position; the driver swerved, and the vehicle left the road. The crew then left the vehicle and returned on foot to the previous position where B4 was located. At 0713 hours, the Deputy Commander of B Company reported what had happened, and assessed that the explosion must have been the result of a hand grenade thrown by Bosniacs, since the latter were in the area. This report was immediately filed up the UNPROFOR chain of command, eventually reaching the Security Council.

The SRSGs morning briefing was held at the same time, and the Force Commander assessed that the Bosniacs were in a position to defend themselves in Srebrenica, but instead were firing on the Dutch blocking position and on the Forward Air Controllers. The SRSG concurred with the negative assessment of the Bosniacs behaviour. The Force Commander then spoke with General Tolimir, who again insisted that the Dutch had not been taken hostage. The Force Commander also asked to speak to General Mladiç, but was told that he had gone to the Srebrenica area in order to resolve the problem.

Meanwhile, in Srebrenica, it transpired that it was not the Bosniacs who had been firing on the UNPROFOR APC, but the Serbs. At 0815 hours, B Company had sent a vehicle to recover the APC that had gone off the road, and reached the scene without being fired upon. It was not able to pull the APC back on to the road, however, and by 1100 hours, the battalion headquarters had sent a specialized recovery vehicle to the scene. As the recovery vehicle approached the scene, it was fired upon with heavy weapons. The Deputy Commander of B Company assessed that a Serb tank had directly fired upon it from the north-east. The observers based in OP Hotel, sitting on high ground, were able to confirm that this was the case. The Deputy Commander of B Company then changed his assessment about what had happened at 0700 hours. Corroborating his changed assessment, he noted also that the debris produced by the earlier detonation was indicative of a much more substantial impact than that of a hand grenade. At 1300 hours, he radioed in his corrected assessment. Three of the blocking positions were still in place, but the one nearest to the town remained unmanned. Some sources approached in the context of this report indicated that the Dutchbat requested close air support at this time, or sometime earlier in the morning, because the warning to the Serbs had been violated. The request, if made, was not approved. It has not been possible to verify at what level the request was turned down, if at all, as there is no written record of it, and a number of the key personnel at each of the higher levels of command do not recall any request having been received at that time.

The SRSGs update on the situation in Srebrenica, sent some hours earlier, had now reached United Nations Headquarters in New York, apparently in time for the Secretary-Generals representative to brief the Security Council on the latest developments. The SRSGs report indicated that the Serbs had resumed their shelling of the town at 0740 hours, with the UNMOs having recorded more than 100 detonations. Incoming Serb fire, presumed to be artillery rounds, had also impacted near the hospital at 1100 hours, shattering its windows. It confirmed that UNPROFOR had not yet returned any of the weapons in the collection points to the ARBiH. It also mistakenly reported, based on the initial assessment from the field, that the ARBiH, and not the BSA, had fired upon the blocking position.

The Secretary-Generals representative then briefed the Security Council, imparting information that turned out to be substantially inaccurate. He indicated that the Serb advance towards the town had stopped, which appears to have been the case at the time. However, he also informed the Council that the BSA had ceased their shelling of the town, though the SRSGs report had indicated that the shelling had resumed that morning. He told the Council that the Bosniacs had fired on an UNPROFOR APC, which was what the SRSG had reported on the basis of incorrect information from the field. Asked for a chronology of requests for air support, he gave no clear answer. He did not report that there had been a series of requests from Dutchbat for close air support between 6 to 8 July, and that they had been turned down in Sarajevo. Neither he, nor anyone else in the Secretariat appear to have been aware of those requests. He also did not mention that a formal request for close air support had been submitted to UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb the day before, although a copy of the request had been transmitted to United Nations Headquarters in New York. A member of the Security Council asked that the information about the Bosniac attack on the UNPROFOR APC be double checked, but this was apparently not done. It is not clear whether telephone conversations between Headquarters and Zagreb or any other exchanges of information occurred, which would explain some of the discrepancies in the oral reporting to the Security Council.

The BSA continued to shell the town throughout the day. B Company also reported a number of firefights between the ARBiH and the BSA in various locations near the blocking positions. UNHCR reported that an estimated two thousand civilians had begun to gather around the hospital, hoping that its special status might protect them from Serb fire. UNHCR also reported that, by approximately 1300 hours, six civilians had been killed and 23 wounded as a result of the shelling. Between around 1100 hours and 1800 hours, however, the BSA did not fire directly at the UNPROFOR blocking positions.

At approximately 1830 hours, B Company reported that Serb infantry had appeared on high ground overlooking the town from the south. The UNPROFOR observers at OP Hotel could also see this action, reporting what they thought to be a company-strength formation of Serb infantry advancing across the ridge-line where Dutchbat had attempted to establish its B2 position. The Company Commander gave the order to fire warning flares from the 81 mm mortar at the B Company base. The first of these was wide of the mark, but subsequent flares were on target. Dutchbat then began firing from the turret-mounted machine-guns of its APCs. Orders were given to fire over the heads of the Serbs. This was done, and the Serbs did not return fire. As this action was taking place, the Dutchbat Commander in Srebrenica called UNPROFORs Sector Northeast headquarters in Tuzla, again requesting close air support. This was approved in Tuzla and Sarajevo, and was passed to UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb. UNPROFOR continued to fire flares at the Serbs, and to direct machine-gun fire over their heads, for approximately one hour, until 1935 hours, when the advancing BSA troops fell back over the ridge-line in a south-westerly direction. At this point, the B Company commander ordered his blocking positions to fall back to locations even nearer to the town, fearing that the BSA might attempt to out-flank them during the hours of darkness.

At approximately 1900 hours, the Chief of Operations at UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb told the Force Commander that the aircraft for close air support were on stand-by, and could be ready if called upon within one hour. He added that the aircraft were night- capable, though this capacity would not be required until after 2030 hours local time. At 1930 hours, a message was received that another UNPROFOR position in Srebrenica, OP Lima, was under attack.

At 1910 hours, the SRSG (who was in Dubrovnik for a meeting with the Croatian Government at that time, but was in constant contact with UNPF HQ and was expected back in Zagreb before midnight) attempted to contact President Miloševiç, unsuccessfully. At 1945 hours, the Force Commanders Chief of Staff (Netherlands) indicated to the SRSGs office that the Serbs had mounted an infantry attack, which was estimated to number approximately 150 soldiers and that the Dutch blocking position had fired warning shots at the Serbs. The Force Commander convened the Crisis Action Team at 1955 hours. During the meeting, he requested the NATO pilots to be cock-pit ready, given that the Serbs had clearly violated the earlier warning. He also remarked that there were no targets to hit, which one of his staff contradicted, claiming that two tanks and artillery had been identified, and that the Forward Air Controllers were in place. At the same time, the Force Commanders Chief of Staff reportedly added that the Dutch government was focused on avoiding casualties to their troops and that a number of OPs were still functioning.

The Force Commander then requested his Chief of Staff to contact the Netherlands Minister of Defence, to determine which line of response his Government supported. The position of the Netherlands Government communicated at the time appears to have been that it would abide by whatever decision the Force Commander believed to be appropriate, even if it led to retaliation against the Dutch peacekeepers being held hostage. Based upon the interviews conducted during the preparation of this report, it does not appear that the Force Commander sought the views of any other government, including his own, at that time.

The UNHCR Special Envoy telephoned the SRSGs office at 2100 hours, reporting that some 4,000 refugees were now in the town and the population was panicking. Srebrenica residents from the southern end of the town began fleeing northwards to the town centre. Survivors recall large crowds of people gathering around the Dutch positions, in the main marketplace and around the B Company base. Public order seemed largely to have broken down by this point. In an interview conducted in connection with this report, President Izetbegoviç recalled having contacted the President of the Srebrenica Executive Council, Osman Suljiç, at about this time. He remembered having told Suljiç to use the anti-tank weapons which had been supplied to the defenders over the previous months. He felt that if the defenders could destroy even one or two Serb tanks, the attack would be halted. It later transpired that the Bosniacs in Srebrenica could not operate those weapons.

At 2115 hours, the Force Commander spoke with General Tolimir who claimed that the Serbs had not shot at the Dutch soldiers and offered safe passage out for United Nations personnel, NGOs and the local population. The Force Commander told Tolomir that the United Nations would not leave the enclave and demanded that the BSA halt their attack. At 2120 hours, UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo reported that the Serbs had by-passed the Dutch blocking positions, and that the Dutch and the Bosniacs were now coordinating a joint defense. The Force Commander called Mladiçs headquarters again at 2125 hours to tell them that the situation was impossible, and that he would do everything he could to avoid the use of force, but that there were limits. Mladiçs staff responded that it was all Muslim propaganda and that they would have to verify the situation themselves.

The Force Commander briefed the staff on his conversation with Mladiçs office at 2135 hours. At this time, reports were received in Zagreb that the fighting in Srebrenica had now stopped. The Force Commander concluded that UNPF was faced with three scenarios:

An officer then relayed a message which he had just received from the Dutchbat Commander in Srebrenica, expressing the latters belief that the blocking position could still hold its ground, and the hope that things would remain calm through the night; the Dutchbat Commander did not consider that close air support would be useful at the moment, but he would like it ready by 0600 hours the following morning. The NATO Liaison Officer responded that the NATO pilots could be put on alert immediately, but that they would not be able to stay in the air all night. The Force Commander summarized his position, stating that he had not used close air support that evening because it was dark and the Serb infantry were better stopped by the Dutch infantry on the ground. He reflected that it was odd that the Serbs had behaved as they did in the middle of a negotiation process.

The Delegate of the SRSG in Belgrade phoned the SRSGs office at 2245 hours to indicate that he had seen President Miloševiç, who had responded not to expect much from him because the Bosnian Serbs did not listen to him. At 2300 hours, the Force Commander, having spoken to General Tolomir, who had told him that the offensive action had stopped, requested his team to reconvene at 0600 hours the next morning.

The Force Commander then dispatched a report to United Nations headquarters in New York providing an update on the situation as of 2300 hours on 10 July. He recounted the extent of BSA shelling of the town during the course of the day and the estimates of casualties received. He stated that during the BSA advance, shortly after 1800 hours, the Dutchbat had directly engaged in firefights with the BSA, using personal weapons and .50 calibre machine guns. (This appears to have been based on initial reports which later proved to be incorrect -- the Dutchbat had not engaged in fire fights with the BSA, but had only fired flares at them, and had fired machine gun rounds over their heads). He noted with concern that two BSA tanks, which had been heard operating behind the BSA infantry lines, might advance to engage the blocking position. He reported that in the evening, the ARBiH had apparently set up defensive positions near the Dutch blocking positions, presumably in an effort to stop the BSA advance, which had stopped as of 2300 hours. However, he also added that other reports had indicated that the Dutch OP on the western boundary of the pocket was surrounded by the BSA and may have been directly targeted.

In his report, the Force Commander also explained why he had decided against the use of close air support that evening. He added that as of 0600 hours the following day, NATO aircraft would be airborne and ready to conduct a close air support mission at shorter notice, and against infantry if necessary, if called upon to do so. He further stated that UNPF Headquarters had considered unacceptable a ceasefire offer by the Serbs (which had been delivered to the Dutchbat Commander by the BSA Commanding Officer), and under which Dutchbat forces would withdraw, without their weapons and equipment, as would NGO personnel. All civilians wishing to evacuate to Tuzla would do so within 48 hours.

At approximately midnight, the Dutchbat Commander convened a meeting with the Bosniac leadership in Srebrenica. The UNMOs summarized the results of the meeting in their report to Sector Northeast a few hours later. They indicated that the Dutchbat Commander had informed the Bosniac leadership in Srebrenica, comprised of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, President of the Executive Council, and the ARBiH Chief of Staff, that the BSA had offered an ultimatum for surrender which UNPROFOR had categorically rejected. The Dutchbat Commander also told the leadership that as of 0600 hours on 11 July (i.e. 5-6 hours later), NATO would conduct a massive air strike against the BSA positions around the enclave if they had not withdrawn to the original boundaries of the safe area. He added that if the BSA did withdraw, then the Dutchbat would re-occupy the OPs which had been overrun. The Mayor expressed disbelief that the air strikes would be employed. The ARBiH Chief of Staff asked the Commander of Dutchbat for guidance on what his forces should do in preparation for the NATO air strike, if it was really to be delivered. In response, the Dutchbat Commander stated that the Bosniacs should stay as far away as possible from the current confrontation line and take cover in their houses. The ARBiH Chief of Staff appears to have passed this information to Bosniac fighters in positions to the south of the town.

During the night, an UNPROFOR position just west of the town noted a stream of people, many of them armed fighters, leaving the town, moving further west. The observers estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 fighters had been seen amongst them.

F.
11 July
-- Initial Confusion over Air Strikes; Close Air Support deployed; Srebrenica falls

The Dutchbat spoke with Sector Northeast at approximately 0400 hours on 11 July, and were told that 40 targets had been identified and that NATO planes would be over their targets at 0650 hours. Accordingly, at approximately 0700 hours, the Dutchbat were in their bunkers, expecting air strikes, as opposed to close air support, to be launched. When the strikes did not materialize, the Deputy Commander of the battalion appears to have telephoned the Chief of Operations in Sector Northeast. The Chief of Operations reportedly responded that there was no record of any air strikes having been requested, and that no requests for close air support had been received either. Thus, while Dutchbat on the ground were waiting for waves of air strikes to take place, the higher levels of command were waiting to be notified that the Serb attack had resumed and that close air support was needed. At 0755 hours, the UNMOs in Srebrenica reported that the situation in the enclave had been unusually but creepily calm and quiet. They also reported that they were securely in their bunkers, as they were expecting large-scale NATO air strikes to be conducted in the next quarter of an hour.

It remains unclear why the UNPROFOR personnel in Srebrenica were expecting air strikes to be deployed automatically. Instructions on this subject appear to have been passed over the telephone, of which no official written record exists. While some of the personnel involved recorded the sequence of events in their personal diaries, there are inconsistencies in those accounts. The official written reports which do exist, between UNPF in Zagreb and United Nations Headquarters in New York, indicate only that UNPF was expecting NATO aircraft to be available for close air support, if necessary. UNPROFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo appears to have had the same understanding, which suggests that somewhere between Sarajevo, Tuzla and Srebrenica, the message was either not conveyed properly over the telephone by Sarajevo, or was misunderstood on the receiving end by Sector Northeast and the Dutchbat in Srebrenica.

The Dutchbat appears to have forwarded a request for close air support at 0745 hours, when they learned that air strikes would not be forthcoming. One senior officer in Sector Northeast at the time recalled from his personal log that he telephoned Dutchbat at 0839 hours to confirm that the request had been received in Sarajevo. UNPROFOR personnel in Sarajevo, interviewed in the context of this report, did not recall a request having been received at that time. Dutchbat then forwarded what may have been its second request of the morning. (A press release issued by Sector Northeast later that day stated that there had been two requests for close air support on the morning of 11 July). Conflicting accounts suggest that a delay of approximately 30 minutes in relaying this request to Sarajevo may have occurred because the request was either deemed by a staff officer in Sector Northeast to have been incomplete, filled-out on the wrong form, or because the facsimile lines between Srebrenica and Tuzla had been down. The request eventually reached Sarajevo around 1000 hours. UNPROFOR BH Command appears to have then requested that the target list be updated further to include targets in the north of the enclave. The information was provided, and at approximately 1045 hours, UNPROFOR BH Command confirmed to Sector Northeast that it had received the full information and was forwarding it to UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb.

The confusion over the air support to be provided and the manner in which it was to be requested appears to have persisted for approximately three hours, between 0700 and 1000 hours. That notwithstanding, although the Serbs had not withdrawn their forces by 1000 hours, they had also not yet resumed their attack on the town or on the blocking positions. During this period, the UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff apparently spoke with NATO representatives who reportedly indicated that the planes which, at UNPFs request, had been airborne since 0600 hours, would soon need to return to Italy in order to refuel. The UNPROFOR Commanders Chief of Staff concurred because the Serb attack had not resumed. At the same time, he requested that the planes return as quickly as possible. He was apparently told that the planes would be available to respond to a request for close air support by approximately 1400 hours.

Sometime before 1000 hours, the SRSG informed his staff that he had spoken with the Secretary-General. The SRSG added that he had declined the Secretary-Generals offer to delegate to him the authority for calling in air strikes. Approximately one hour later, UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb received the request from UNPROFOR BH Command for close air support for Dutchbat in Srebrenica.

The Serbs resumed their attack at approximately 1100 hours, with direct tank fire against Dutchbat positions. By 1130 hours, B Company was reporting that the BSA was firing at its compound. The BSA also began shelling OPs Mike and November in the northern portion of the enclave. At 1200 hours, the Force Commander advised the SRSG to approve the request for close air support to be used against any forces either attacking the blocking positions or firing with heavy weapons on other United Nations positions in Srebrenica town. The SRSG approved the request at 1217 hours, providing additional authorization for close air support against any forces attacking United Nations Observation Posts along the perimeter of the enclave. It is worth noting that the same form which had been submitted to Zagreb on 9 July was the one which the Force Commander and the SRSG signed on 11 July. In their view, it was a standing request which would be acted upon based upon the receipt of updated target information and the notification, communicated verbally if necessary, that the warning of 9 July to the Serbs had not been heeded. Thus, the confusion between Srebrenica and Tuzla over the forms on the morning of 11 July appears to have been, in Zagrebs perspective, irrelevant to the decision to approve close air support.

At 1210 hours, the UNMOs in Srebrenica reported that the crew of OP November had withdrawn, under Serb fire, to a new position approximately 400 metres behind the OP. At almost the same time, a Serb tank fired at one of the Dutch APCs in the B1 blocking position. At 1230 hours, the BSA began firing on OP Hotel, which was located on high ground overlooking Srebrenica town and positions to the south. Within half an hour, the Serbs were shelling the town from positions to the south and east. At around 1330 hours, the BSA fired two shells which impacted in the B Company compound, where 4,000 to 5,000 Bosniac civilians were taking refuge; an unspecified number were injured.

The advancing Serb forces now entered the town encountering little or no resistance either from UNPROFOR or from the ARBiH. The Serb flag was hoisted above a bakery at the southern end of the town at 1407 hours, according to one individual who was there at the time. The residents of Srebrenica town, including those who had sought refuge at the B Company base, began to flee northwards in the direction of Poto...ari by approximately 1430 hours. Srebrenica had fallen. Up until that point, at least 3 (but possibly up to 5) requests for air support by the Dutchbat had been turned down at various levels in the chain of command. Dutchbat had also not fired a single shot directly at the advancing Serb forces.

Eighteen NATO aircraft by now had made their way to Srebrenica. Six of them were detailed to attack targets, with the remainder largely designated for the surpression of enemy air defense systems (SEAD), if required. At approximately 1440 hours, two NATO aircraft dropped a total of two bombs on what were thought to be Serb vehicles advancing towards the town from the south. It was not clear at the time what damage had been done, if any. NATO aircraft also overflew the southern and northwestern portions of the enclave, respectively, but were unable to locate targets.

Immediately following this first deployment of NATO close air support, the BSA radioed a message to the Dutchbat. They threatened to shell the town and the compound where thousands of inhabitants had begun to gather, and to kill the Dutchbat soldiers being held hostage, if NATO continued with its use of air power. The SRSG recalled having received a telephone call from the Netherlands Minister of Defence at this time, requesting that the close air support action be discontinued, because Serb soldiers on the scene were too close to Dutch troops, and their safety would be jeopardized. The SRSG felt that he had no other choice but to comply with this request. The message was passed to NATO accordingly, and the air action was halted. The Minister made similar calls to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in New York and his Military Adviser (a Dutch Major-General) at the same time, which were echoed in démarches by the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands.

President Miloševiç telephoned the SRSG at 1500 hours, and stated that the Dutchbat soldiers in Serb-held areas had retained their weapons and equipment, and were free to move about. This was not true.

At 1600 hours, the UNMOs reported that upwards of 20,000 inhabitants, mainly women, children and the elderly, were converging on the Dutchbat Headquarters compound in Poto...ari. They added that ...the shelling of the town [had been ongoing] despite the airstrikes....the town is in the hands of the BSA...B-Coy has left the compound in Srebrenica and is heading for Poto...ari...the airstrikes on the north part of the enclave have not taken place up till now...that means that the compound is a very easy target for all the weapons on the north ridge of the enclave. A covering note transmitting this UNMO report stated that, apparently, there has been too little too late.

About an hour earlier, Dutchbat had assigned the battalions logistics officer and approximately 30 soldiers to coordinate the reception of the people fleeing from Srebrenica. The commanding officer assessed that the main gate to the compound was vulnerable to Serb fire, and accordingly ordered that a hole be cut in the fence on the other side of the compound. Some 4,000 to 5,000 refugees had entered the compound through this hole by the early evening. Dutchbat then assessed that it did not have the provisions or space required to accommodate any more refugees and blocked entry into the compound for the additional refugees who were struggling to get in. These refugees, estimated to number some 15,000 to 20,000, were also comprised mainly of women, children and elderly. They remained outside the compound, in its immediate vicinity, throughout the night.

The majority of Srebrenicas men of military age did not seek refuge in Poto...ari. The vast majority of them, including the civilian and military authorities (as well as some of their families), decided instead that they would risk making their way on foot to Tuzla, some 50 km away, through Serb lines and through forested, partly mined territory. They decided that they would fight their way through if they had to. By mid-afternoon on 11 July, the men who were preparing to make the journey began to gather in the hamlet of Šušnjari, located in the north-western portion of the enclave.

Meanwhile, the Acting-UNPROFOR Commander spoke with General Gvero, Deputy Commander of the BSA, at 1810 hours. The notes of the conversation indicate that he told Gvero that, while the NATO aircraft had been withdrawn from the area, they could be recalled at any time. He also informed him that the Dutchbat Commander had been instructed to contact the BSA in order to obtain a ceasefire. He further stated that he would defend his troops if and when attacked and requested that the Dutchbat soldiers currently being held by the BSA be released immediately. General Gvero pledged to look into the situation and to revert back the following morning.

Upon the Force Commanders request, the acting-UNPROFOR Commander then issued instructions to Dutchbat, ordering them to enter into negotiations with the BSA to secure an immediate ceasefire. He added that giving up any weapons and military equipment [was] not authorized and [was] not a point of discussion. He ordered the Dutchbat to concentrate their forces into the Poto...ari compound and to withdraw from the remaining OPs. He ordered them to take all reasonable measures to protect refugees and civilians in [their] care. He added that they should continue with all possible means to defend [their] forces and installation from attack. This was to include the use of close air support if necessary. While noting the clarity of the instructions, the Dutchbat commanders assessed that they were simply no longer in a position to carry them out.

Sometime around 2000 hours, the Serbs contacted Dutchbat using the communications equipment in one of the vehicles that they had commandeered in the preceding days. They instructed the Dutchbat Commander to come to the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac for a meeting. He arrived there at approximately 2030 hours, and was surprised to find General Mladiç, accompanied by General ðivanoviç, the Commander of the BSA Drina Corps. The BSA had gathered a considerable media entourage as well. The meeting lasted roughly 45 minutes, which Mladiç reportedly used mostly to shout at the Dutchbat commander, accusing him and the United Nations of having wrongfully used air power against the BSA. He blamed the United Nations for not having disarmed the Bosniacs in Srebrenica. The Dutchbat commander attempted to explain the desperate situation of the thousands of inhabitants who had gathered in Poto...ari. Mladiç responded that the Dutchbat Commander should return for a second meeting at 2330 hours, and that he should bring with him representatives of the refugees, and if possible, someone from the civil authorities.

The Dutchbat commander returned to the Hotel Fontana at 2330 hours accompanied by the Director of Srebrenicas High School, whom he had asked to serve as a representative of the refugees. (Of the towns official civilian leaders, only Ibran Mustafiç, representative of Srebrenica in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, joined the Bosniacs seeking protection from UNPROFOR at Poto...ari. All other leaders, expressing scepticism as to whether UNPROFOR was willing or able to protect them, chose to join the group which was fighting its way to Tuzla). During the second meeting with General Mladiç, the Dutchbat Commander again tried to explain the situation of the refugees in Poto...ari and of the approximately 100 wounded personnel in the compound. General Mladiç pledged to evacuate the wounded and guaranteed to treat them according to the Geneva Conventions. He demanded that the ARBiH hand-over their weapons to the BSA, and if they failed to, threatened to shell Dutchbat compound in Poto...ari. He committed to a ceasefire which would last until 1000 hours on 12 July, at which time he wanted to hold a third meeting with the Dutchbat Commander and representatives of the refugees. He also asked to see Naser Oriç, to which the Dutchbat Commander responded that he had not seen Oriç in the enclave since April. The meeting concluded at approximately 0100 hours on 12 July.

Returning to the battalion compound at Poto...ari, the Dutchbat Commander sent a report to Zagreb, Sarajevo and Tuzla, as well as to the Crisis Staff in The Hague, describing the two meetings that he had had with Mladiç. He concluded his report by stating that there are now more than 15,000 people within one square kilometre, including the battalion, in an extreme vulnerable position: the sitting duck position, not able to defend these people at all. (sic) He went on to describe precisely the location of BSA artillery and tanks within direct sight of the compound. He ended his message with a plea:

The Bosniac men gathered in Šušnjari began to move out of the enclave into surrounding Serb territory shortly after midnight on 12 July. The men, who may have numbered up to 15,000, were divided roughly into brigade groups, with the strongest units moving out first, to act as a spearhead for those that followed. Perhaps a third of the group was armed. Progress out of the enclave was initially slow, with the men having to pass in single file through the Serb minefields that lay beyond the perimeter of the enclave. The last units left Šušnjari in the early afternoon of 12 July, more than 12 hours after the first.

Despite this slow progress, the Serbs did not immediately engage the column of Bosniac men. Darkness, forest cover and surprise appear to have provided some initial protection for the Bosniacs. Some time before dawn, however, the Serbs began to engage the column with heavy weapons. Several survivors interviewed in connection with this report have given accounts of what they believe to have been chemical weapons attacks. They described artillery shells impacting and then leaving a lingering plume of white smoke or gas. Those nearest to the impact were not killed, but became disoriented, and some appear to have wandered away from the main column into the surrounding Serb territory. Two medical doctors present in the column witnessed these events, and are of the belief that those affected were under the influence of non-lethal chemical agents.