First Net Print, November 23 1999
Second Net Print, November 25 1999
Third Net Print, October 30 2001

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 53/35 (1998)

IX.
THE FALL OF ðEPA AND THE NEW SAFE AREA POLICY:
JULY-OCTOBER 1995

A.
Preparations for the attack on ðepa:
11 to 14 July 1995

The Bosnian Serb media announced the capture of Srebrenica, in a strong counter-attack, on the evening news broadcasts of 11 July. The same broadcasts reported that Bosniac fighters were laying down their weapons and that General Mladiç expected Bosniac units in ðepa to do the same within 48 hours. UNPROFOR confirmed that, having captured Srebrenica, Serb forces were turning their attention to ðepa. The Ukrainian battalion in ðepa reported that Serb forces had initiated a sporadic bombardment of the town and two nearby hamlets, suggesting that preparations for a wider attack were under way.

During this initial stage of the Serb operation, UNPF appears not to have given serious consideration to the use of force to deter attacks on ðepa. The UNPROFOR forces within the enclave, comprising a single battalion of Ukrainian troops, were clearly incapable of resisting a concerted Serb attack. The Force Commander sent guidelines to his subordinate commander in Sarajevo on 14 July, telling him that, given the present situation, close air support could not be considered. Two UNPROFOR officials at a lower level did propose a new demilitarization agreement for ðepa. If the Serbs refused the agreement, or if they continued to advance after the Bosniacs had accepted it, the officials proposed that Serb weapons attacking ðepa, or other military assets, as well as their direct and essential support facilities, be subject to NATO air strikes. This proposal was not accepted, and no alternative arrangements to deter Serb attacks on the enclave were taken at this stage.

At about this time, forces loyal to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to have lost any remaining confidence in UNPROFORs commitment to the enclaves. On the night of 13-14 July, members of the Ukrainian company stationed in Gorañde were told by the Bosniacs to turn over their weapons, vehicles, helmets and body armour. A stand-off ensued, followed by brief exchanges of fire on 14 and 15 July. The Ukrainians then complied with the Bosniac demands, after which elements of a British battalion stationed in Gorañde provided protection for the disarmed Ukrainians. The Force Commander reported to the Secretariat that the Bosniac actions were completely unacceptable and should be condemned at the highest levels. Protests were lodged with President Izetbegoviç.

B.
Attack, resistance and negotiations in ðepa:
14 - 20 July 1995

The Serbs announced the beginning of a full-scale assault on ðepa with a message to UNPROFOR on 14 July. The message demanded that UNPROFOR evacuate its observation posts in the safe area, pending an attack which would begin at 1400 hours the same day. UNPROFOR units remained in position, and Serb forces began to bombard them and Bosniac forces around the perimeter of the enclave at approximately 1500 hours. Shortly before nightfall, Serb forces were reported to be moving forward into the enclave from positions to the west.

Due to ðepas remote location and to poor communications, there then followed a period of considerable uncertainty. The uncertainty was compounded by misinformation spread from the Serb side and by contradictory information from different Bosniac sources. Civilian leaders of the Bosniac population within the pocket began to negotiate what were reported to be surrender terms with the Serbs. Government authorities in Sarajevo, however, insisted that those negotiators were not authorized to negotiate a capitulation agreement. Meeting with the UNPROFOR Commander on 18 July, President Izetbegoviç nevertheless did agree that arrangements for the evacuation of ðepa should be put in place. General Mladiç informed UNPROFOR that ðepa had effectively fallen at 1330 hours on 19 July, and that he would be organizing the transportation of the local civilian population to Federation-held territory to the west. Mladiç insisted, however, that men between the ages of 18 and 55 surrender themselves to his forces. That evening he announced that the local Bosniac leaders had accepted what he called surrender conditions.

By the next day, it was clear that the situation was more complex than Mladiç had indicated. The Bosniacs in ðepa had agreed, in principle, that the civilian population would be transported out of the enclave, under UNPROFOR supervision, along with the wounded. The Bosniac military commander, Colonel Avdo Paliç, however, had said that he would not implement any part of the agreement without authorization from Sarajevo. Furthermore, there was some confusion as to what would happen to the men of fighting age, who were estimated to number between 1,000 and 2,000. The Serbs had initially insisted that they surrender, but then seemed to accept that they should also be transported to safety as part of an all-for-all prisoner exchange.

A series of four-way negotiations then followed between the Government authorities in Sarajevo, the Bosniacs in ðepa, the Serbs and UNPROFOR. One of the complicating factors was a statement by Mladiç that there could be no agreement on the transportation to safety of the people of ðepa until the Government had agreed to an all-for-all prisoner exchange throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Serbs had long sought. The Government authorities insisted that this could not happen until the Serbs had accounted for the 6,800 men it said were still missing from Srebrenica. A further complicating factor was the continuing Serb advance into the enclave, and the threats to UNPROFOR personnel made by both parties. UNPROFOR concluded that its role would be to monitor the transportation of civilians from ðepa to the town of Kladanj, in the main body of Federation-held territory, and to assist directly with the movement to Sarajevo of wounded civilians. UNPROFOR also concluded that it should assist in the negotiation of the prisoner exchange agreement proposed by Mladiç. Arrangements were made accordingly.

For several days a stalemate ensued. UNPROFOR assessed the situation to be as follows:

On 20 July, the President of the Security Council issued a statement, indicating that the Council was deeply concerned by the situation in and around the safe area of ðepa. In the statement, the Council demanded that the Serbs refrain from further action threatening the civilian population of the enclave, and condemned all violations of international humanitarian law. It also demanded that UNHCR be given unhindered access to the area. The statement did not specify how these demands were to be implemented. It concluded by strongly condemning recent acts of violence and intimidation against UNPROFOR, suggesting that both parties were guilty in this regard. (S/PRST/1995/33)

C.
First formal reports about atrocities believed to have been committed in Srebrenica;

Dutchbat departure from Poto…ari

The fate of the men and boys of Srebrenica remained unknown at this point, although a preliminary report from UNPROFOR investigators in Tuzla signalled that there may have been reason to fear the worst. It stated that, based on the interviews the investigators had been able to conduct by 20 July, there was a strong basis to believe that significant human rights abuses occurred both before and during the convoy from Srebrenica. The report continued: While the number of those killed, beaten, and perhaps, sexually assaulted remains unknown, there is little doubt that some incidents of severe human rights violations occurred. In particular, the separation and apparent continuing detention of civilian men and boys presents an ongoing human rights abuse of grave concern. It also indicated that those interviewed who made their way on foot from Srebrenica report many civilian casualties, resulting from both Serb military attacks and mines that lay in their path from Srebrenica. The report added that some accounts, as yet unconfirmed, involved large-scale military assaults by Serbs soldiers which could have resulted in numerous deaths. Based on the number of persons believed to be missing from this group, some speculate that as many as 3,000 may have died during the trip somewhere between Srebrenica and Bosnian-held territory. Some of this group have given compelling testimony concerning crossing mined areas in single-file, holding hands and following the same footsteps, leaving dead and wounded behind. The report concluded that, following discussions with the Personal Representative of the High Commission for Human Rights (Mr. Mazowiecki), UNHCR, ICRC, MSF and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), it was apparent that efforts to assess the human rights abuses which occurred in the wake of the fall of Srebrenica had scarcely begun. The report was immediately transmitted in full to the United Nations Secretariat.

On 21 July, all United Nations personnel in Poto…ari were finally able to depart the area, and arrived in Zagreb the following day. A number of them were debriefed by United Nations personnel, who submitted a comprehensive report to the SRSG ten days later. The report indicated that several members of Dutchbat had witnessed or had substantial reason to believe that the BSA committed human rights abuses in the Poto…ari area from 11-13 July, including beatings and a limited number of summary executions. The report also indicated that a member of Dutchbat had seen several dead bodies along the road between Bratunac and Konjeviç Polje and at Kasaba. Another Dutchbat member had seen approximately 200 to 300 persons detained in the football stadium. The report concluded:

D.
The London Meeting and changes in the approach to the use of air strikes

405. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence from 15 countries (Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States) convened in London on 21 July. Troop contributors to UNPROFOR, as well as members of the Security Council, the United Nations Secretariat, the European Union and NATO were represented. The Foreign Secretary of the host nation chaired the meeting.

A number of participants have since described the meeting as an ad hoc gathering, with no particular documentation prepared in advance, and with no consensus reached at its conclusion. The Russian Federation, in particular, objected that the apparent conclusions reached did not reflect its views in full. Nevertheless, the Chairman read out a statement after the meeting which emphasized that the current Bosnian Serb offensives, and the continuing siege of Sarajevo, must be met with a firm and rapid response. They defy international law and opinion. He indicated that the meeting had therefore warned that any attack on Gorañde will be met with a substantial and decisive response, including the use of air power, and that the participants had also underlined [their] determination to ensure access to Sarajevo for delivery of provisions to the civilian population and resupply of the UN forces, and support for the early use of the Rapid Reaction Force to protect UNPROFOR in maintaining access for these deliveries. The Chairman also stated that the meeting had insisted on immediate access for UNHCR and ICRC to the male detainees from Srebrenica. Building on the London statement, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France soon after made a demarche to the Bosnian Serb military leadership, indicating that the Bosnian Serbs would be exposed to robust action, including from the air, if they continued to attack the safe areas, Gorañde, in particular.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group, meeting at the Ministerial level in Geneva on 21 July, issued a communique (S/1995/612 ) which took note of the statement issued in London, and expressed the hope that the commitments contained therein [would] be implemented. At the same time, the OIC made a number of statements querying why the London meeting had not signalled its resolve to respond to attacks on ðepa and Bihaç. The OIC added that it would seek to ensure Bosnia and Herzegovinas right to self-defence, under article 51 of the United Nations Charter, in the event that the international community did not find the resolve to protect those areas.

The Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Mr. Mazowiecki, also reacted with concern, noting during a press conference held on the same day, that not a single word had been mentioned about ðepa at the London meeting. He added that the human rights investigation about the fall of Srebrenica had thus far revealed violations of a generally barbaric nature. One week later, Mr. Mazowiecki resigned. He wrote to the Secretary-General: Events in recent weeks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and above all the fact that the United Nations has allowed Srebrenica and ðepa to fall, along with the horrendous tragedy which has beset the population of those safe havens guaranteed by international agreements, oblige me to state that I do not see any possibility of continuing the mandate of Special Rapporteur entrusted to me by the Commission on Human Rights. Mr. Mazowiecki went on to state that: Human rights violations continue blatantly. There are constant blockages of the delivery of humanitarian aid. The civilian population is shelled remorselessly and the blue helmets and representatives of humanitarian organizations are dying. Crimes have been committed with swiftness and brutality and by contrast the response of the international community has been slow and ineffectual.

Illustrative of his frustration, the ICRC had not been granted access to the Srebrenica area to ascertain the fate of the missing until a few days after the London Meeting. And once granted access by the BSA to the Batkovic camp in north-eastern Bosnia, ICRC was only able to register 164 prisoners from Srebrenica and 44 from ðepa. The ICRC delegates were told that no other prisoners were being held, and were accordingly shown a number of empty detention centres in the Bratunac area. As of November 1999, 7,336 individuals from Srebrenica remain unaccounted for, based on the number of tracing requests for missing persons received by the ICRC.

Not until a number of weeks later did additional information come to light which substantiated the worst fears about the fate of the men from Srebrenica. On 10 August, the Permanent Representative of the United States informed the Security Council that classified satellite photographs taken by her Government had captured images of freshly disturbed earth, near a football stadium approximately 22 kilometres north by north-west of Bratunac. She explained that the combination of the satellite photographs, and the eyewitness testimony of those survivors who had independently described scenes of killings in the area, provided compelling physical evidence that atrocities had taken place, and that the victims had been buried in mass graves.

E.
Operational arrangements resulting from the London Conference

With Srebrenica having fallen, and ðepa under attack, the London Meeting had apparently drawn a line in the sand at Gorañde, but had not set out clearly how it would be determined that the line had been crossed. Would one shell into Gorañde constitute an attack on the safe area? queried one senior Secretariat official in a note to the Secretary-General, or would the Serbs have to actually capture chunks of the enclave before they would be met with a decisive response?

Two decisions of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 25 July and 1 August, respectively, clarified some of these issues, and built upon the Chairmans Statement at the London Meeting. The first decision authorised the initiation of air strikes (as opposed to close air support) for as long as was considered needed in the common judgement of NATO and United Nations military commanders to support the defence of Gorañde within a wider geographic area (a zone of action), including against any concentrations of troops, if NATO and United Nations commanders both judged that they posed a serious threat to the Safe Area. The NAC extended these arrangements to the other safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihaç in its decision of 1 August 1995.

Immediately following the issuance of the first NAC decision, the SRSG indicated to New York that, while he understood the pressures for a more robust response to attacks upon the safe area of Gorañde, he was concerned by the provisions in the decision which essentially provided for the automatic use of air strikes. The Secretary-General immediately responded, telling the SRSG that, in spite of the concerns raised, he had decided to extend his support to the North Atlantic Councils decisions relating to the use of NATO air power to deter Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorañde. The Secretary-General agreed with the NACs conclusion that an attack by the Bosnian Serbs on Gorañde should be met by a firm and decisive response, including through air strikes. He accordingly instructed the SRSG to work with NATO to define the zone of action referred to in the NAC decision, and to agree upon the criteria for identifying the factors that would trigger the mechanisms proposed by NATO. He reminded the SRSG of the NACs suggestion to delegate execution authority to the United Nations military commanders. In order to streamline decision-making within the United Nations chain of command when the use of air power was deemed necessary, the Secretary-General decided to delegate the necessary authority in this respect to the Force Commander of United Nations Peace Forces, with immediate effect.

The Secretary-General requested the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Military Adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the UNPF Force Commander to enter into discussions with NATO on the operational details emanating from the NACs decision of 25 July.

F.
The fall of ðepa and the flight to Serbia

While the issue of how to address a possible attack on Gorañde was being debated within the international community, Minister Muratovic clarified the Bosnian Governments position on ðepa, which had still not fallen. On 23 July, in a meeting with UNPROFOR, he stated that the Bosnian leadership had met in Sarajevo, and reached the following decisions:

The Bosniac leaderships reluctance to evacuate the men of fighting age appeared to have two aspects: first, it wanted the men of ðepa to keep fighting; and, second, if the fight could not be continued, it wanted guarantees that the men who were evacuated were transported in safety. References were made to the large number of Bosniac men who had been transported from Srebrenica and who were now missing. A Bosnian Government representative added Sarajevos assessment that the situation in ðepa was desperate, but not yet so desperate that the people are willing to endure a repeat of Srebrenica. The Governments position was conveyed to the Serbs, who rejected it.

During this hiatus, internal meetings within UNPROFOR were held to determine how to proceed. The earlier UNPROFOR proposal to demilitarize ðepa and then to threaten the Serbs with air strikes if they attacked was discussed again. The Commander of UNPROFOR forces in Sector Sarajevo (the sector into which ðepa fell), agreed that the proposal should be tried. Before planning could proceed, however, he was informed by the Force Commander that the London conference had made no mention of any commitment to use force to deter attacks on ðepa, and that it would difficult to find any nation willing to send troops to ðepa. UNPROFOR then consulted with the Bosnian Government authorities and with the Serbs.

During this same period, the Serbs were becoming more aggressive around the other safe areas. A major attack on the Bihaç enclave had begun on 19 July, involving not only Bosnian Serb forces, but also Croatian Serb forces and the Autonomist forces loyal to Fikret Abdiç. Substantial advances by the attacking forces were reported. The Bosnian Government appealed for help to the Croatian Government, and on 23 July, Presidents Izetbegoviç and Tudjman signed an agreement in Split, under the terms of which the two countries committed themselves to working together to resist Serb aggression.

The bombardment of the Sarajevo area also increased during this period, with Serb gunners hitting UNPROFOR targets as well as civilian areas of the city. Two incidents on 22 July, in which two French UNPROFOR officers were killed and four other UNPROFOR members injured, prompted a military response from UNPROFOR. The UNPROFOR Commander of Sector Sarajevo ordered a military response to the attacks, and 90 mortar rounds were fired at Serb positions around Sarajevo. UNPROFOR threatened further escalation if Serb attacks did not cease. Following this, Serb attacks decreased somewhat, particularly against UNPROFOR targets. Nevertheless, the Bosnian Ministry of Health reported that 25 Bosnian civilians were killed in Sarajevo that week, and 75 more injured, as a result of increased shelling.

On 24 July, the Serbs presented UNPROFOR with the text of a capitulation agreement signed by Hamdija Torlak, Chief of Staff of Bosniac forces in ðepa. The agreement provided for the evacuation to the Federation of women, children and the elderly, and for the surrender of the Bosniac men, who would then be exchanged back to Government-held territory.

This agreement was transmitted by UNPROFOR to Minister Muratovic, who said that he had no knowledge of it, that Torlak had no authority to negotiate on behalf of his Government, and that, in any case, Sarajevo would not accept the agreement unless the evacuation of ðepa was performed by UNPROFOR. There will be no repeat of Srebrenica; no people being pulled off buses; the United Nations must control the operation. He added that, if there was to be a total evacuation of the enclave, civilians should go first, then the military.

The next day, General Mladiç concluded an agreement with UNPROFOR under which UNPROFOR would organize medical evacuations from ðepa and would temporarily insert troops into the enclave to oversee the transportation by the Serbs of Bosniac civilians being moved to Kladanj. The situation was thus far from clear: the Bosniacs in ðepa understood that they had an agreement with the Serbs; the Bosnian Government authorities in Sarajevo understood that there was an agreement, but subject to certain provisos; UNPROFOR had its own agreement with the Serbs; and all these agreements seemed to be connected to the successful outcome of a separate negotiating process under which there might be an all-for-all prisoner exchange.

UNPROFOR made the following assessment in a communication to Headquarters:

By the evening of 25 July, there were reports that, in line with the local agreement signed by Torlak, Bosnian Government fighters were falling back from the front lines around ðepa. Serb forces moved forward, occupying the town of ðepa itself and the other population centres within the enclave. Also in line with the agreement, Bosniac civilians were reported to be coming down from the hills and from remote settlements into ðepa town and the other Serb-controlled areas, awaiting evacuation. The Bosniac commander in ðepa, Colonel Paliç, agreed to work with UNPROFOR and the Serbs to ensure that the evacuations took place in an orderly fashion.

The evacuation of the sick and wounded to Sarajevo began immediately, with Serb buses taking approximately 150 people to Lukavica, a Serb-held community near Sarajevo, from where they were taken into Sarajevo in an UNPROFOR convoy. The transportation of civilians also began. By the end of the day on 25 July, 21 Serb buses filled with Bosniac civilians had already departed for the Kladanj area. The buses had stopped approximately 7 km from the confrontation line, after which the Bosniacs had been required to walk the remaining distance to the safety of Government-held territory. This evacuation continued for two more days, with Ukrainian UNPROFOR troops present in the departing buses. It was conducted in a relatively orderly fashion, despite the absence in ðepa of any international humanitarian organizations, including ICRC and UNHCR. No violent abuses against the deportees were noted until the afternoon of 27 July, when 36 Bosniacs, including 12 lightly wounded people, were taken off a bus by Serb forces. (The Serbs later acknowledged this, but claimed that those seized were men of military age, who had been taken into detention as prisoners of war.) By the evening of 27 July, almost 5,000 people had made it in safety to Kladanj.

Almost as soon as the transportation of Bosniac civilians began, however, it became clear that the local agreement was not going to be implemented in full. The Bosniac men of military age did not present themselves to the Serbs, apparently awaiting further assurances that they, too, would be transported in safety to Federation-held territory. Reports indicated that, having left the front lines, the men split into small groups and moved to the densely forested interior of the enclave, where they were less vulnerable to the armour and heavy weapons of the Serbs.

The negotiations which would have allowed the Bosniac men to leave ðepa in safety resumed the next day, but made no progress. Bosnian Government negotiators agreed that there should be an all-for-all exchange of prisoners, but did not agree that the Bosniacs in ðepa should surrender to the Serbs. UNPROFOR reported that the Government negotiators accepted that their fighters in ðepa could be registered by the ICRC as prisoners, but that, in implementation of the all-for-all exchange, these men would leave the pocket before they ever entered Serb custody. This was rejected by the Serbs.

By the evening of 27 July, the evacuation of Bosniac non-combatants from ðepa was almost complete. As the process of transporting the civilians drew to a close, the Serbs appeared to be preparing to enter the areas to which the Bosniac men had withdrawn. Shortly after the departure of the last buses, Serb troops detained Paliç, who was then in the presence of two UNPROFOR civilians. General Mladiç called the UNPROFOR Commander to say that the Bosniac fighters had until 1800 hours the same day to surrender, after which those who had not surrendered would be attacked. This message was passed to the Bosnian Government authorities in Sarajevo. While the authorities in Sarajevo still opposed any surrender arrangement that would allow these men to fall into Serb hands, the men of ðepa themselves seemed inclined to make some arrangement locally, before a final Serb attack. The next morning, UNPROFOR representatives contacted Mladiç, asking him what had happened to Paliç, who would be leading the local-level negotiations. Mladiç informed UNPROFOR that Paliç was dead. The next day, the Serbs detained the senior Bosniac civilian negotiator; two more Bosniac negotiators were detained shortly after.

The UNPROFOR Commander of Sector Sarajevo met with General Tolimir in the ðepa area on 28 July. Tolimir stated that the local Bosniac military seemed willing to surrender, provided that UNPROFOR would guarantee their safety. The UNPROFOR Commander responded that UNPROFOR was not in a position to provide such guarantees in the absence of a prisoner exchange agreement between the parties. Tolimir offered to allow UNPROFOR to send vehicles to gather the Bosniac soldiers and any remaining civilians, but UNPROFOR declined. By the evening of 28 July, UNPROFOR was assessing that the Serbs were no longer interested in an all-for-all prisoner exchange, and were likely to make a final attack into the rump enclave.

Before the Serbs could close in on the men of ðepa, events elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina overtook them. Croat forces which had been slowly advancing up the Livno valley in the southwest of Bosnia and Herzegovina for several months, surged forward, seizing the Serb-held towns of Glamoç and Grahovo on 29 July. Not only did this action put some 10,000 Serb civilians to flight, but it also left Knin, the administrative centre of the Croatian Serbs, vulnerable to attack from three sides. General Mladiç, who had spent the whole of July in the Srebrenica-ðepa area of eastern Bosnia, moved to Banja Luka, taking key staff, including General Tolimir, and some military resources with him. At a meeting with the UNPROFOR Commander in Banja Luka on 31 July, General Mladiç appeared relatively uninterested in events in ðepa, focusing instead on the Croat operation unfolding in the southwest.

A debate took place within UNPROFOR on how to proceed. On 29 July, the UNPROFOR Commander wrote to his superiors in UNPF headquarters in Zagreb that the BSA regular troops around ðepa had largely been withdrawn, and that most of the remaining troops were reservists, whom he assessed would not conduct operations to clear the area of remaining Bosniacs. He concluded: UNPROFOR has a duty -- moral, mandated and stated in the recent Presidential Statement -- to remain in the pocket as long as civilians are unaccounted for. To withdraw will mean the abandonment of these people with further loss of United Nations credibility. Two days later, however, with the immediate pressure from the Serbs off, the remaining Bosniacs in the ðepa area began to exfiltrate themselves to safety. Some proceeded west to Federation-held territory, but most crossed over the river Drina, entering the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where they surrendered themselves to the Yugoslav forces. UNPROFOR evacuated its own personnel from the ðepa area on 2 and 3 August. Three convoys transported 203 UNPROFOR personnel to Sarajevo without incident. As of November 1999, the total number of persons unaccounted for from ðepa is 118, based on the tracing requests for missing persons received by the ICRC.

G.
Operation Storm and the United States-led peace initiative

The Bosnian Serb civilian leadership considered the attack on ðepa to have been a debacle. On 4 August, the day the Croatian Government began Operation Storm, Dr. Karadñiç publicly stated that he was dismissing Mladiç as Commander of the BSA and appointing himself Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska and Director of the General Staff of the Supreme Command. In an accompanying statement, Karadñiç criticized Mladiç for having taken so long in ðepa and for having used so many forces in that operation, suggesting that Mladiç had ignored the growing Croat threat and was responsible, through his negligence, for the fall of Glamoç and Grahovo. He also criticized Mladiç for negotiating with Messrs. Bildt and Stoltenberg, which, he said, was tantamount to treason. Criticism was also directed at General Tolimir, who had assisted General Mladiç in the ðepa operation.

After ðepa, the Serbs next target was the safe area of Bihaç. Forces loyal to Fikret Abdiç were advancing from the north towards the Government-held town of Cazin. Bosnian Serb forces attacked from positions to the south and east of Bihaç town. As the situation deteriorated, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina called on the Government of Croatia to intervene on the basis of the Split agreement of 23 July. On 4 August, Croatian Government forces launched Operation Storm, a major offensive against Serb-held territory in the Krajina region of Croatia. Although Croatian Government spokesmen referred to the appeal of the Bosnian Government to relieve the attack on the Bihaç safe area, the offensive was much more wide-ranging. Within three days, the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina had been largely destroyed; the administrative centre of Knin had been captured by Croatian Government forces, along with the whole of United Nations Protected Areas North and South.

Approximately 200,000 Serbs fled their homes in Croatia during and immediately after the fighting. The few that remained were subjected to violent abuses by the victorious Croats. Although the majority of the displaced Serbs fled through Bosnia and Herzegovina or Croatia to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a group of some 20,000 looked for shelter in Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That group included much of the so-called Army of Republika Srpska Krajina, which had withdrawn largely intact from Croatia. Their arrival led to the expulsion of the residual non-Serb population in the Banja Luka area. Croats, in particular, were ejected to make way for incoming Serbs.

With the collapse of the Republika Srpska Krajina, pressure on Bosnian Government forces in Bihaç and Cazin eased. The ARBiH Fifth Corps immediately went onto the offensive, easily defeating the Autonomists loyal to Fikret Abdiç and retaking the town of Velika Kladusa. Elements of Fifth Corps also crossed the border into the Republic of Croatia, where they met up with advancing Croatian units.

The United States peace-negotiating team led by Mr. Richard Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, sought to use these events to advance the peace process. In a meeting with SRSG Akashi on 16 August, Mr. Holbrooke explained that the evolving military situation, including a role to be played by the credible use of air power by NATO, would be essential in the development of a coherent military and diplomatic approach to resolving the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In preparation for the possible use of air power, Mr. Holbrooke urged the United Nations to remove all military observers and other personnel from locations where they could be taken hostage by the Serbs. The Force Commander expressed caution, arguing that UNPF must continue to perform missions on the ground requiring an unavoidable degree of vulnerability. General Clark, who was with Mr. Holbrookes delegation, stated that, by continuing to discuss the danger of reprisals, UNPF was undercutting the deterrent value of the decisions taken at the London Meeting.

At the end of August, the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Claes, told a representative of the Secretariat that he was aware of the link between air strikes and the political process being pursued by Mr. Holbrooke. The same day, the Force Commander was instructed to send regular updates on the situation on the ground and on contacts with the Serbs to General Clark, who was travelling with Mr. Holbrooke. This was done, and UNPROFOR soon began producing daily maps of the military situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating the exact percentage of territory held by each party. These maps were generated with greater frequency as the territorial division of the country approached 51:49.

H.
Attack on the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo

Five mortar rounds landed in a crowded area of downtown Sarajevo shortly after 1100 hours on 28 August. Four of the rounds caused only minimal material damage; one round, however, landed in the Markale marketplace, the scene of a similar attack on 5 February 1994. Thirty-seven people, most of them civilians, were killed in and around the marketplace, and approximately 90 were injured. A confidential report to the UNPROFOR Commander concluded that the five rounds had been fired from the Serb-held area of Lukavica, to the west of Sarajevo. (The secrecy surrounding the UNPROFOR investigation into this incident gave rise to speculation, fuelled by the Serbs, that there was doubt as to which side had fired the mortar rounds. A review of United Nations documentation, however, confirms that UNPROFOR considered the evidence clear: all five rounds had been fired by the Serbs.)

On the day of the attack, the Force Commander based in Zagreb, who controlled the United Nations key to launch air attacks, was absent on personal business. The key had therefore passed temporarily to the UNPROFOR Commander in Sarajevo. The latter decided to initiate a request for NATO air strikes against the Serbs, calculating that force could be used to advantage. The goal of the enforcement operation would be to remove Serb weapons from within striking distance of the safe area of Sarajevo, and to lift the siege of the city. Two problems, however, prevented the UNPROFOR Commander from turning the key immediately. First, despite sustained efforts over two months to remove UNPROFOR troops from positions from which they could be taken hostage by Serb forces, a detachment of UNPROFOR troops was moving through Serb-held territory in eastern Bosnia, on its way out of Gorañde. Second, UNPROFORs facilities in Sarajevo were, as ever, scattered across the floor of the valley in which Sarajevo lies, exposed to fire from Serb mortars and artillery in the surrounding hills.

The UNPROFOR Commander called Mladiç to ensure that the movement of UNPROFOR troops out of Serb-held territory would not be hindered. Not wishing to arouse the Serbs suspicions, which could have led to the detention of the exposed UNPROFOR troops, the UNPROFOR Commander decided not to tell Mladiç that UNPROFOR experts had confirmed that the mortar rounds had been fired by the Serbs, or that he was planning to launch an air campaign against the Serbs in response. Mladiç was apparently satisfied, allowing the UNPROFOR unit in eastern Bosnia to proceed across the international border into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a manoeuvre which was completed in the same evening. Again concerned not to arouse Serb suspicions, the UNPROFOR Commander also made a statement to the press in which he was equivocal, both as to who had fired the mortar rounds and as to how UNPROFOR intended to respond. The press, and the Bosnian Government authorities, were, like Mladiç, convinced that there would be no dramatic response to the massacre. The Government lodged a protest against what it described as the latest example of a pattern of UNPROFOR inaction.

The UNPROFOR Commander turned his key at approximately 2000 hours on 28 August, without consulting his superiors in the United Nations or any of the troop contributing countries. (The Secretariat noted with concern that it had learned of the decision only six hours later, and had not yet received any information confirming responsibility for the mortar attack itself). The UNPROFOR Commander did, however, speak several times with the Commander of NATOs Southern Command, holder of the NATO key. The latter dispatched a message stating that, in the common judgement of the UNPROFOR Commander and himself, the conditions for the initiation of air strikes against the set of targets in the Sarajevo area had been met. He said that he and the UNPROFOR commander had agreed that air strikes would begin as soon as the weather and technical considerations allowed. He added that the air strikes would continue until, in the common judgement of the NATO and United Nations military commanders, the attacks on, or threat to, Sarajevo had ceased.

I.
Operation Deliberate Force

The NATO air attacks, referred to as Operation Deliberate Force, commenced at 0300 hours on 30 August, and were accompanied by a 600-round barrage from the heavy guns of the Rapid Reaction Force. Parallel letters were then sent to the Bosnian Serb civilian and military leadership by SRSG Akashi and the Force Commander. Mr. Akashi wrote to Karadñiç as follows:

443. The Force Commander wrote a second letter to Mladiç the same day, proposing three conditions which, if accepted by the Serbs, would allow him to recommend that NATO halt its air attacks. The three conditions were:

NATO aircraft attacked a broad range of targets associated with the Serb air defense system, as well as substantive targets, including ammunition storage facilities and other similar targets. In addition, the heavy guns of the Rapid Reaction Force had engaged 19 targets, most of them Serb heavy weapons positions, from UNPROFOR positions on Mt Igman. A representative of the Bosnian Serb political leadership called UNPROFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, threatening a massive, uncontrolled retaliation against Sarajevo. In fact, however, the Serb military response was relatively light: one NATO aircraft, a French Mirage strike aircraft, was brought down, and a small number of rounds were fired at UNPROFOR positions without inflicting casualties.

The United Nations Secretariat had a number of reservations about the course of action on which the peacekeeping mission had embarked. The Force Commanders letter had raised the threshold for compliance by positing requirements that Mladiç might refuse to agree to under the pressure of air strikes. The United Nations may have thus committed itself to continuing air strikes until such agreement was obtained. The Secretariat was also concerned that the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was not only responding to attacks with counter-battery fire, but was also operating in the offensive mode. The Secretariat urged UNPF not to go beyond a zone of reasonableness that was circumscribed by the missions mandate, by the basic and indispensable impartiality of the United Nations, and by the need to continue to work with all parties to achieve a durable settlement.

J.
Serb assessment of Operation Deliberate Force

At the same time, the Serbs were also taking stock of their position. General Mladiç gave an extended statement on the operation on the evening of 30 August. He acknowledged considerable damage to Bosnian Serb facilities, and claimed to be amazed that the international community is holding some sort of olive branch in one hand, offering a sort of peace option with the other. He claimed that neither the Bosniacs nor the Croats could threaten Republika Srpska without NATO and the UNPROFOR Rapid Reaction Force, but acknowledged that, because of the actions of NATO and the Rapid Reaction Force, Republika Srpska had become vulnerable, particularly to attacks by the Croats. His statement was belligerent, but he added that, in spite of the horrendous bombardment by NATO, it is time to talk about peace. He also replied to the Force Commanders three proposals, but conditionally. This was not acceptable to the United Nations or to NATO.

The next day Mr. Karadñiç wrote to Mr. Akashi in a similar vein. I wish to make it perfectly plain to you that we cannot accept that NATO has involved itself in this civil war on the side of our enemies. It is now clear that the NATO air attacks have nothing whatsoever to do with the shelling of Sarajevo on Monday, which in any case was not the responsibility of the Serbs. In fact, no one is hiding the fact that the aim of the current aerial onslaught against us is to weaken our military strength in order to soften us up before the continuation of negotiations. He added that the National Assembly of Republika Srpska had welcomed the United States peace initiative and expressed its readiness to conclude peace ... and, most important, on 29 August, [the Bosnian Serb side had] signed with the representatives of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia an agreement establishing a joint delegation in peace negotiations. From all this [it can be concluded] that, just as there was no reason for the initiation of brutal air attacks, which have so far caused untold damage, there is likewise no reason for their continuation.

K.
The pause; a new peace map; opening a road into Sarajevo

There were no air attacks on 31 August, due to bad weather. NATO informed UNPROFOR that attacks would have been possible in poor weather, but that the rules of engagement being applied required the pilots to make visual contact with targets, in order to reduce collateral damage. A formal pause was put into effect at 0400 hours on 1 September to facilitate a meeting between the Force Commander and Mladiç. After some procedural objections on the part of the latter, that meeting eventually began in Zvornik in the late afternoon of 1 September. The meeting was difficult and lasted for 13 hours. While General accepted some of the demands made by the Force Commander in his letter of 30 August, he made Serb compliance with the other elements contingent upon conditions which in the end were not acceptable to the United Nations.

During the pause, the UNPROFOR Commander met with President Izetbegoviç, who expressed considerable optimism about Operation Deliberate Force and how it might impact upon the peace process. The President explained that, following the fall of Srebrenica and ðepa, the Bosnian Government authorities were looking favourably at the possibility of exchanging those areas with Serbs. In return for ceding Srebrenica and ðepa to the Serbs in a peace deal, the Bosnian Government authorities were looking to be ceded that part of Sarajevo which had been allocated to the Serbs under the Contact Group peace plan. President Izetbegoviç went on to explain that the problem in any peace settlement would be to make reality fit in with the lines drawn on the map. He felt that Operation Deliberate Force, which was focused on Serb military assets around Sarajevo, could be useful in that regard. The UNPROFOR Commander said that any action by Bosnian Government forces in the area of NATO/RRF operations would almost certainly work to the political disadvantage of the Government. He also felt that Bosnian military operations in other areas might be problematic. President Izetbegoviç accepted that reasoning as far as Sarajevo was concerned, but stated that his forces would be pursuing military objectives elsewhere, to create facts on the ground.

While talks continued in Sarajevo, the UNPROFOR Commander decided to open a land route into Sarajevo for the use of local civilians. He wrote to the Bosnian Government and to the Serbs on 2 September, informing them that, as of the next day, the roads over Sarajevo airport would be opened to local civilian traffic without clearance or inspection by either side. Mom…ilo Krajišnik, acting on behalf of the Bosnian Serb leadership, warned of heavy consequences if the roads were opened without the consent of the Serbs. The UNPROFOR Commander replied that any attempt by the Serbs to interfere with movement into the city would be met with disproportionate force. At 1500 hours on 3 September, the road from Butmir to Sarajevo was opened. Despite their threats, Serb forces did not attempt to fire at traffic across the airport. For the first time since May 1992, therefore, civilian vehicles were moving unimpeded between Sarajevo and the outside world. Local commentators noted that, with the silencing of the Serb guns and the opening of a direct land road out of the city, the three-and-a-half-year siege of Sarajevo had come to an end.

L.
Resumption of air and ground attacks

At the meeting in Zvornik on 1 September, the Force Commander had given General the deadline of 2300 hours local time on 4 September, to comply fully with the conditions laid down in his earlier letter. Upon being informed, the Secretariat noted that compliance with these demands is a basic precondition for UNPROFORs ability to perform its humanitarian mandate and its responsibility to deter attacks against safe areas. A letter from General , dated 4 September, seemed to indicate that his forces did not intend to comply with the United Nations terms. During a series of telephone conversations with UNPROFOR, Bosnian Serb Vice President Koljeviç claimed that General did not have the authority to write such a letter and that the BSA leadership had been ordered to withdraw. Based on the fact that no withdrawal was observed by 0800 hours the following morning, the Force Commander and his NATO counterpart, decided to resume the air operation. Ninety NATO aircraft took part in further strikes when the operation resumed at 1305 hours.

The Secretariat briefed the Security Council to explain the resumption of the air and ground campaign. Despite earlier having argued that the more general use of force would require a new mandate from the Council, and that resolution 836 (1993) gave UNPROFOR a mandate to use force essentially only in self-defence, the Secretariat now took a different line reflecting the change of political will in the international community that has been manifested at, and since, the London Conference of July 1995. It said that the BSA had been given a deadline to comply with three demands, and had been warned that if they failed to do so, the air operation would resume. The Secretariat emphasized that these conditions were consistent with Security Council resolution 836 (1993), and added that they were a precondition for UNPROFORs ability to perform its humanitarian mandate and to uphold its responsibility to deter attacks against the safe areas. (Emphasis added.) The Secretariat added that the rules of engagement being used were essentially those in effect since 1973, i.e. that force could be used in self-defence, including defence of the mandate. The Secretariat argued that the mandate included the provision of humanitarian assistance and the deterrence of attacks against the safe areas. Thus, the Secretariat concluded, any BSA weapons firing or showing signs of hostile intent were being engaged by the RRF. Not all members of the Security Council concurred with this interpretation of the mandate, and one, in particular, formally expressed its concern to the Secretary-General in this regard.

Despite these statements supporting a strong line, and now conveying a much broader interpretation of resolution 836 (1993), the Secretariat took exception to a statement made at a press briefing by the UNPRFOR spokesman just before the air campaign resumed: The aim is to cripple the BSA war machine and render its military capabilities so devalued that General is forced to negotiate. The Secretariat indicated to the UNPF that it had been frankly appalled to read the UNPROFOR military spokesmans statement, and reminded the mission that the declared aims of the air operation were to ensure the safety and security of the safe areas, notably by forcing the withdrawal of BSA heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo. The Secretariat emphasized that the United Nations had no mandate from the Security Council to cripple the BSA war machine, and would not obtain such a mandate if it sought it. There was no immediate response from Sarajevo, prompting a second message instructing the UNPROFOR spokesmen to curb their verbal bloodlust. UNPF replied that it hoped that the Secretariat would support its objectives for the air and land operations in which it was then engaged. UNPF defined those objectives as follows:

A further exchange of correspondence took place when the Reuters news agency quoted the same UNPROFOR spokesman as saying: Were into peace enforcement here. Peace enforcement is not negotiating ... Weve seen that; it has failed over the years here. We are saying, If you do not do this, no conditions, you continue to get bombed. The Secretariat sought a formal explanation of these remarks. The UNPROFOR Commander did not reply immediately, though he later stated that, As a result of our enforcement action, UNPROFOR abandoned its peacekeeping mission -- at least in the Sarajevo area. We remain, for the time being, in the position of combatants: coercing and enforcing our demands on the BSA. He then proposed some adjustments to the UNPROFOR rules of engagement, despite the fact that the suggested amendments have been deemed to be incompatible with the peacekeeping nature of our mandates.

By 6 September, the Option 2 targets in the Sarajevo area had partly been exhausted, and NATO aircraft began to strike targets as far away as Bosanski Brod, in the far north of the country. The Secretariat expressed concern that the campaign appeared to have crossed into Option 3' action (expanded operations beyond the immediate areas under siege) without obtaining either NATO or Security Council authority for doing so. The Secretariat asked UNPF to explain how far the Zone of Action for Sarajevo extended, and whether, for example, NATO could justify bombing Banja Luka airfield under the present dispensation.

M.
The United States-led peace initiative; concerns about the mandate

The first public breakthrough in the peace process led by the United States came on 8 September in Geneva with the signing of a Joint Statement and Agreed Basic Principles by the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Those principles affirmed that Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue its legal existence within its present borders; that it would consist of two entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska; and that the 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group would be the basis for a settlement. President Izetbegoviç expressed some concern about the Principles, particularly about the fact that the name Republika Srpska would be recognized as the name of the Bosnian Serb entity. It was a bitter but not poisonous pill which we had to swallow. He said that he had not been willing to enter into a dispute with the United States that might have led to an end of the NATO air action. The Bosnian Serb leadership and media was overwhelmingly positive about the Principles.

Operation Deliberate Force reached its climax when, during a meeting between the Force Commander and General on 10 September, 13 Tomahawk missiles were launched against elements of the Bosnian Serb air defense system in the Banja Luka region. This was followed by a strike suppressing air defence systems in the same area. This action led to a protest from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation. Three days later, after lengthy consultations in Belgrade, Ambassador Holbrooke and his team were able to secure A Framework for a Cessation of Hostilities within the Sarajevo Total Exclusion Zone. The Framework, which was signed by the Bosnian Serb leadership and witnessed by Serbian and Montenegrin leaders, met all of the conditions laid down by the Force Commander in his letter of 3 September, and went some way towards laying the groundwork for an overall peace agreement.

The Force Commander then wrote to President Miloševiç, stating that, after consultation with his NATO counterpart, he was in a position to inform the President that the Framework for a Cessation of Hostilities provided sufficient grounds to temporarily suspend NATO air strikes against targets in the Republika Sprksa. Offensive air operations had been suspended for 72 hours beginning at 2200 (local time), on 14 September, and if there was clear evidence of withdrawal of substantial numbers of heavy weapons beyond the limits of the Sarajevo total exclusion zone (TEZ), then the suspension of offensive air operations would be extended for a further 72 hours. As Serb compliance was deemed to be satisfactory, the pause was extended, and then extended again. Operation Deliberate Force was formally brought to a close on 21 September. From its commencement on 30 August to its close, over 3,000 air sorties had been flown, and more than 60 targets had been attacked from the air.

With the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina apparently drawing to a close, the Secretary-General wrote a formal letter to the President of the Security Council in which he proposed an end to UNPROFOR. He wrote as follows:

N.
Croatian offensive and the end of hostilities

The Serbs began to move their heavy weapons away from Sarajevo as agreed in the Framework for a Cessation of Hostilities. As agreed in discussions with the international community, the Bosnian Government did not advance into Serb-held areas around Sarajevo as the weapons were withdrawn. In the Western part of the country, however, rapid advances into Serb-held territory were being made by Bosnian Government forces and, in particular, by Croatian forces. Donji Vakuf fell to Bosnian Government forces on 13 September; Croatian forces entered Jajce on the same day.

The United States continued with its efforts to modulate the military situation on the ground. Writing after the event, Mr. Holbrooke recalled a meeting with President Tudjman of Croatia on 17 September:

Until the end of July, the Bosnian Serbs had controlled approximately 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By 22 September, UNPROFOR assessed that the Serbs controlled approximately 49 percent of the country, while the Federation partners controlled approximately 51 percent between them (approximately 30 percent for the Bosniacs and 21 percent for the Croats). The map of the battlefield broadly resembled the territorial arrangements being proposed by the United States team.

Approximately 90,000 Serbs, mainly from Western Bosnia, were displaced in this final phase of the war. Also displaced were 25,000 Bosniacs, most of them supporters of Fikret Abdiç fleeing the advance of Bosnian Government forces in the Bihaç enclave. In the shadow of this military situation, the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed, on 26 September, to a set of Further Agreed Principles, detailing the principles that would undergird the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution to be agreed as part of a peace settlement. President Izetbegoviç gave some support to the Further Agreed Principles. Mr. Karadñiç issued a statement informing the people of Republika Srpska that, on the basis of the Further Agreed Principles, a political solution might be found in the near future.

With the territorial issues largely resolved on the battlefield, the United States negotiators turned to the question of ending the hostilities. An agreement was signed by President Izetbegoviç, Mr. Karadñiç, Mr. Krajišnik and General on 5 October, and was to come into effect at 0001 hours on 10 October, provided that at that time full gas and electrical utility service shall have been restored in the city of Sarajevo. The five-day delay, and the proviso about the utilities for Sarajevo, gave the Bosnian Government and Croatian forces some time during which to capture the territory referred to by Mr. Holbrooke in his meeting with President Tudjman. As the deadline of 10 October approached, Bosnian Government forces were poised to take Sanski Most, while Croatian forces were preparing to enter Mrkonjiç Grad, to the southwest of Banja Luka. In an effort to gain time with which to secure Sanski Most and to move onto Prijedor, the Bosnian Government negotiator, Dr. Muratoviç, noted that full utility service had not yet been fully restored to Sarajevo by the original deadline. A delay was secured in this way, during which the ARBiH was able to capture Sanski Most and the Croatians were able to secure Mrkonjiç Grad and move further north. (In taking these last areas, the Federation partners controlled approximately 52 percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.) The Bosnian Government concluded, however, that its forces would not be able to take Prijedor in the immediate future. With the concurrence of both parties, therefore, the agreement entered into force at 0001 hours on 12 October, ending the three-and-a-half year war.