First Net Print, November 23 1999
Second Net Print, November 25 1999
Third Net Print, October 30 2001

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 53/35 (1998)

III.
THE ADOPTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 819 (1993), 824 (1993) AND 836 (1993)

A.

Minimal consensus within the Security Council: The lowest common denominator

As the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated, the activity of the Security Council increased. During the 18-month period from the opening of full-scale hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992 to 5 October 1993, 47 Security Council resolutions were adopted and 42 Statements of the President of the Council were issued on matters relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The majority of these dealt directly with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this date, no issue in the history of the Security Council has engendered more resolutions and statements over a comparable period.

Despite this unprecedented flow of resolutions and statements, however, consensus within the Council was limited. There was general agreement on the need for action, but less agreement as to what action was appropriate. The Secretary-General understood that the Council was able to reach consensus on three broad areas: the need to alleviate the consequences of the war; the need to contain the conflict; and the need to promote the prospects for a negotiated peace settlement. Up until that point, the following measures had been taken to address these three needs:

Relatively early in the conflict, a discernible pattern of decision-making emerged in the Security Council. Those countries which opposed lifting the arms embargo committed increasing numbers of troops to UNPROFOR, but resisted efforts to expand the UNPROFOR mandate in such a way as to bring the Force into direct military confrontation with the Serbs. Those countries which favoured more robust action, but which did not have troops on the ground, sought progressively to expand UNPROFOR's mandate and to use the Force directly to confront the Serbs. The result was the deployment by France, the United Kingdom and others of forces which were largely configured and equipped for traditional peacekeeping duties rather than enforcement action. At the same time, in an effort to find some consensus in the Council, resolutions were adopted in which some of the more robust language favoured by non-troop-contributing nations was accommodated. Chapter VII of the Charter was invoked with increasing frequency, though often without specifying what that implied in terms of UNPROFOR operations. In this way, the efforts of Member States to find compromise between divergent positions led to UNPROFOR's mandate becoming rhetorically more robust than the Force itself. During the 18-month period of maximum Security Council activity on this issue, Bosnian Serb forces operated almost unchecked; by the time the confrontation line stabilized, in mid-1993, approximately two million people, or one half of the total population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had fled their homes or been expelled.

44 Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in January 1994, later wrote as follows:

B.
The concept of safe areas

One of the proposals which emerged during this search for compromise within the Council was to establish security zones, safe havens and protected areas for the Bosniac population. In his remarks to the London Conference of 26-27 August 1992, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga, stated that the international community had a vital role to play. Forced transfers, harassment, arrests and killings must cease at once, he stated. He added that a haven would have to be found for some 10,000 detainees already visited by the ICRC in northern and eastern Bosnia. He then asked delegates whether or not they would consider establishing protected zones as one of several options for addressing the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In October 1992 the ICRC issued a paper in which it stated that, The present situation calls for the creation of zones ... which need international protection. The ICRC spoke of the need to protect threatened communities in their places of residence. For this protection to be effective, the parties to the conflict must facilitate the deployment of UNPROFOR contingents, and the UN forces mandate must be expanded.

Some representatives of the United Nations were also supportive at this early stage. In his Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1992/2-1/10), dated 27 October 1992, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, concluded that a large number of displaced persons would not have to seek refuge abroad if their security could be guaranteed and if they could be provided with both sufficient food supplies and adequate medical care. In this context the concept of security zones within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be actively pursued. (Ibid., para. 25(b))

Austria, which was then serving as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, was the first Member State to pursue actively the possibility of establishing safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, the permanent members of the Security Council were not supportive, and the first set of discussions on this issue led only to a carefully worded operative paragraph in resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, inviting the Secretary-General, in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant international humanitarian agencies, to study the possibility of and the requirement for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes.

Almost immediately, a number of problems became apparent. First, if they were to function effectively, the safe areas would have to be established with the consent of the parties; that consent, however, might not be forthcoming. Second, the concept advanced by the humanitarian agencies was of zones occupied entirely by civilians, open to all ethnic groups and free of any military activity. Such zones would by definition have to be demilitarized, but no demilitarized zones of this nature existed in the country. Third, whether or not the safe areas were demilitarized, UNPROFOR would likely have to protect them, requiring substantial new troop contributions, which might also not be forthcoming. Fourth, the establishment of safe areas implied that other areas would not be safe, and not be protected, inviting Serb attacks on them. The Co-Chairmen of ICFY, Lord Owen and Mr. Vance, began to air these problems publicly. Lord Owen stated, towards the end of November 1992, that he felt the proposals for the establishment of safe areas were flawed in concept. Repeating a similar message the following month, Mr. Vance told the Security Council that, in his view, the establishment of safe areas would encourage further ethnic cleansing.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, expressed caution on the subject in her letter to the Secretary-General, dated 17 December 1992. She supported the general principle that security should be provided in situ, and that peacekeepers should be deployed to provide military protection for persecuted groups. She believed, however, that the safe area concept should only be a last option. She voiced particular concern about the possible reaction of the parties to the conflict, which were either opposed to the concept, or wanted to use it to further their own military objectives. She also noted that some capacity for enforcement action by the international community would be required, and even then the complete preservation of security would be doubtful. She concluded in her letter to the Secretary-General that in the absence of a political settlement, protracted camp-like situations would risk being perpetuated.

The Secretariat agreed that, for the safe areas to be viable, the United Nations would have to exercise some political control over the local authorities, to ensure that they took no action (such as using the zones as bases from which to launch military operations) which would increase the risk of attacks against them. The Secretariat anticipated, however, that it would be very difficult to exercise such control. It also questioned whether traditional peacekeeping rules of engagement would be sufficient to discourage any violations of the safe areas.

The Force Commander of UNPROFOR opposed the concept of establishing safe areas other than by agreement between the belligerents. He was concerned that the nature of the safe area mandate which was being proposed would be inherently incompatible with peacekeeping. He did not oppose the principle of protecting the Bosnian Government and its armed forces against Serb attack, but opined that there could be no role for peacekeepers in such an operation. Protecting the safe areas, in his view, was a job for a combat-capable, peace-enforcement operation. He summarized his position in a communication to the Secretariat, stating that one cannot make war and peace at the same time.

C.
Security Council resolution 819 (1993)

Before the Security Council had time to finalise its position about the concept of safe areas, events on the ground demanded further action. The High Commissioner for Refugees wrote to the Secretary-General on 2 April 1993 (S/25519), that the people of Srebrenica were convinced that the Bosnian Serbs [would] pursue their military objective to gain control of Srebrenica. She noted that evacuation of non-combatants from Srebrenica was one option, and that these people were desperate to escape to safety because they see no other prospect than death if they remain where they are. She stressed, however, that the Bosnian Government authorities were opposed to continued evacuation of people, which they see as designed to empty the town of its women and children in order to facilitate a subsequent Serbian offensive. Under the circumstances, Mrs. Ogata concluded:

The Secretary-General presented the High Commissioners letter to the Security Council, after which extended consultations took place among the members of the Council. Broadly, the members of the Non-Aligned Caucus, represented principally by Pakistan and Venezuela, proposed strong action to reverse Serb aggression. The Caucus initially favoured two lines of approach: tightening sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and lifting the arms embargo established under Security Council resolution 713 (1991) as it applied to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Explaining the latter proposal, the Non-Aligned Caucus argued that the embargo was hampering the right to self-defense of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Non-Aligned Caucus tabled a draft resolution to this effect, which the President of the Council decided would be put to the vote on 26 April. Events on the ground, however, were overtaking the Security Councils consultations. On 13 April 1993, Serb commanders informed the representative of UNHCR that they would enter Srebrenica within two days unless the town surrendered and its Bosniac population was evacuated. On 16 April, the Secretary-Generals Special Political Advisor, Mr. Chinmaya Gharekhan (who represented the Secretary-General in the Security Council), informed the Council that he had been in contact with the Force Commander of UNPROFOR and that United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) stationed in Srebrenica had reported that the town had not yet fallen, but that the authorities there had offered to surrender on three conditions:

There was considerable confusion in the Council, with the representative of one Member State indicating that he had heard from national sources that Srebrenica had already fallen. After extended debate, the Council adopted a draft resolution tabled by the Non-Aligned Caucus, as resolution 819 (1993). The resolution demanded that all parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. It also demanded the immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica. It further demanded that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, no specific restrictions were put on the activities of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). Upon learning of the resolution, UNPROFOR expressed concern to the Secretariat that the regime could not be implemented without the consent of both parties which, given Serb dominance, would certainly require Bosnian Government forces to lay down their weapons.

The Security Council, although acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, had provided no resources nor mandate for UNPROFOR to impose its demands on the parties. Rather, it requested the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings.

Thus, the Council appeared to rule out Mrs. Ogatas evacuation option, and instead condemned and rejected the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Following the adoption of resolution 819 (1993), and on the basis of consultations with members of the Council, the Secretariat informed the UNPROFOR Force Commander that, in its view, the resolution, calling as it did for the parties to take certain actions, created no military obligations for UNPROFOR to establish or protect such a safe area.

D.
The Srebrenica demilitarization agreement of 18 April 1993

While the Security Council was speaking out strongly against the actions of the Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR was confronted with the reality that the Serbs were in a position of complete military dominance around Srebrenica, and that the town and its population were at risk. UNPROFOR commanders, therefore, took a different approach from the Council, convincing the Bosniac commanders that they should sign an agreement in which Bosniac forces would give up their arms to UNPROFOR in return for the promise of a cease-fire, the insertion of an UNPROFOR company into Srebrenica, the evacuation of the seriously wounded and seriously ill, unimpeded access for UNHCR and ICRC, and certain other provisions (see S/25700). Representatives of the Bosnian Government were apparently divided as to how to proceed. According to General Haliloviç, then Commander of the ARBiH, President Izetbegoviç was in favour of the UNPROFOR proposal, which, as he understood it, meant that the Bosniacs would hand their weapons over to UNPROFOR in return for UNPROFOR protection.

The text of the agreement was negotiated in Sarajevo on 17 April 1993, and was signed by General Haliloviç and General Mladiç early in the morning of 18 April. The Force Commander witnessed the agreement on behalf of UNPROFOR. The agreement laid down the terms under which Srebrenica would be demilitarized, though it did not define the area to be demilitarized. Haliloviç has since stated that he understood the agreement to cover only the urban area of Srebrenica, and not the rural parts of the enclave. UNPROFOR seems also to have understood the agreement in this way. The Serbs, however, did not. The agreement also called for the deployment of UNPROFOR troops into the area by 1100 hours on 18 April in order to secure a landing site for helicopters which would evacuate wounded personnel from Srebrenica; for the monitoring of the cease-fire in Srebrenica and those areas outside the town from which direct fire weapons could be brought to bear; and for the establishment of liaison with authorized military leaders of both sides.

Approximately 170 UNPROFOR troops, principally from the Canadian contingent, deployed into the Srebrenica area on 18 April, establishing a substantial UNPROFOR presence there for the first time. The Canadian force then proceeded to oversee the demilitarization of the town of Srebrenica, though not of the surrounding area. Haliloviç has stated that he ordered the Bosniacs in Srebrenica not to hand over any serviceable weapons or ammunition. The Bosniacs accordingly handed over approximately 300 weapons, a large number of which were non-serviceable; they also handed over a small number of heavy weapons, for which there was no significant amount of ammunition. A large number of light weapons were removed to areas outside the town.

The Secretariat informed the Force Commander that, in light of the views of several Council members, he should not pursue the demilitarization process in Srebrenica with undue zeal, ruling out, for example, house-to-house searches for weapons. On 21 April UNPROFOR released a press statement entitled Demilitarization of Srebrenica a success. That document stated that UNPROFOR troops, civilian police and military observers had been deployed in Srebrenica since 18 April to collect weapons, ammunitions, mines, explosives and combat supplies and that by noon today they had completed the task of demilitarizing the town. The statement noted further that almost 500 sick and wounded had also been evacuated from Srebrenica by helicopters and humanitarian aid convoys have been entering the town since Sunday. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR was quoted as saying, I can confirm that from noon today the town has been demilitarized ... The [UNPROFOR] team prepared a final inventory of all the collected weapons and munitions, which were then destroyed by UNPROFOR.

E.
Security Council Mission to Srebrenica and further demilitarization agreement of 8 May 1993

Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 819 (1993), members of the Security Council had a rare opportunity to assess the situation on the ground first hand, when a Security Council mission let by H.E. Mr. Diego Arria, Permanent Representative of Venezuela, arrived in Srebrenica on 25 April. On arrival in Srebrenica, the mission members noted that whereas the Council resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993 had demanded that certain steps be taken by the Serbs, the UNPROFOR-brokered agreement of 18 April 1993 had required the Bosniacs to disarm. Confronted with the reality of the situation on the ground, the Council Members appeared to support the UNPROFOR course of action. In their report submitted shortly upon return to New York (S/25700), the members of the Security Council Mission wrote that the alternative could have been a massacre of 25,000 people. It definitely was an extraordinary emergency situation that had prompted UNPROFOR to act .... There is no doubt that had this agreement not been reached, most probably a massacre would have taken place, which justifies the efforts of the UNPROFOR Commander. The Council Members then condemned the Serbs for perpetrating a slow-motion process of genocide. Comparing the approach of the Council with that of UNPROFOR, a Canadian UNPROFOR officer told the Council Members that even though the Security Council is obviously an important organ of the United Nations, it is of no importance to the Serbs in the area. (Ibid.)

The report of the Security Council mission noted the discrepancy between the Security Council resolutions and the situation on the ground. It stated that Even though Security Council resolution 819 (1993) declared the city [of Srebrenica] a safe area, the actual situation obviously does not correspond to either the spirit or the intent of the resolution. The mission report then stated that Serb forces must withdraw to points from which they cannot attack, harass or terrorize the town. UNPROFOR should be in a position to determine the related parameters. The mission believes, as does UNPROFOR, that the actual 4.5 kilometers by 0.5 kilometers decided as a safe area should be greatly expanded. How this was to be done was not indicated. The mission report recommended that Gorañde, ðepa, Tuzla and Sarajevo also be declared safe areas, as an act of Security Council preventive diplomacy. The report concluded by recognizing that such a decision would require a larger UNPROFOR presence, a revised mandate to encompass cease-fire/safe area monitoring and different rules of engagement. It proposed the stepwise introduction of measures that could, if the Serbs ignored the integrity of the safe areas, lead to eventual consideration of military strike enforcement measures.

On the ground, events were developing in a different direction. The agreement witnessed by the Force Commander on 18 April was followed by a more comprehensive agreement on 8 May, in which General Haliloviç and General Mladiç agreed on measures covering the whole of the Srebrenica enclave and the adjacent enclave of ðepa. Under the terms of the new agreement, Bosniac forces within the enclave would hand over their weapons, ammunition and mines to UNPROFOR, after which Serb heavy weapons and units that constitute a menace to the demilitarized zones which will have been established in ðepa and Srebrenica will be withdrawn. Unlike the earlier agreement, the agreement of 8 May stated specifically that Srebrenica was to be considered a demilitarized zone, as referred to in Article 60 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).

F.
Security Council resolution 824 (1993)

As had been the case on 16-18 April, the cease-fire negotiations of 6-8 May took place simultaneously with consultations of the Security Council. A draft resolution presented by the Non-Aligned Caucus welcomed the recommendations of the Security Council Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and proposed expanding the safe area regime to include the city of Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, ðepa, Gorañde and Bihaç. During the Security Council consultations of 5 May, the Secretary-Generals Special Political Advisor remarked that the Secretary-General would normally be requested to make recommendations on the resources he would need to ensure that the status of these towns as safe areas was respected. He added that UNPROFOR could not be expected to take on this additional responsibility within its existing resources and that it would need at least one brigade in each town declared a safe area. Quite simply, he concluded, the Secretary-General did not have the means to implement this draft resolution.

On 6 May, Members of the Security Council learned that the Bosnian Serb Assembly had rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The Council then adopted the draft under discussion, as resolution 824 (1993), which declared that Sarajevo, and other towns, such as Tuzla, ðepa, Gorañde and Bihaç, should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act. It also declared that in the safe areas the following should be observed:

As with resolution 819 (1993), all of the Councils demands in resolution 824 (1993) were directed at the Serbs. UNPROFOR, as before, stated that it could not implement the resolution unless there were an agreement between the parties or unless it were given the resources to enforce it in the face of Serb opposition. References to enforcement measures, which had been proposed in a draft submitted by members of the Non-Aligned Caucus, however, had not been included in the text of resolution 824 (1993). Instead, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to strengthen UNPROFOR with 50 additional unarmed United Nations military observers.

Noting the discrepancy between the agreement of 8 May 1993 that had been negotiated on the ground by UNPROFOR, and the resolution concurrently passed by the Council, the Secretariat explained to UNPROFOR that the Security Council had laid great emphasis in resolution 824 on the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs from their positions threatening the safe areas. The Secretariat believed that it was essential that UNPROFOR reiterate its determination to ensure the implementation of those parts of the agreement concerning the Serb withdrawal from around the safe area. The Secretariat added that the implied sequence in the agreement -- with Government forces disarming first, followed by a Serb withdrawal later -- would be unacceptable to the Security Council.

G.
The end of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; moves to strengthen the safe area regime

Following the rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, a >referendum was held in Serb-controlled territory on 15 and 16 May. The Pale authorities claimed that the result of the referendum overwhelmingly confirmed the decision of the assembly to reject the peace plan, which had only been signed by Dr. Karadñiç on the condition of the formers concurrence. This led to a new round of activity in the international community, the focus of which was on how to stabilize the military situation on the ground.

On 14 May, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan transmitted a memorandum containing the views and concerns of the members of the Security Council that were members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25782) to the President of the Security Council. The memorandum presented the argument that the safe area concept would fail unless the security of those areas was guaranteed and protected by UNPROFOR. Without these guarantees and protection, the memorandum stated, such safe areas will provide no help to their inhabitants but rather force them into helpless submission. The failure of the international community to use enforcement measures, or to use the threat of such enforcement measures, would inevitably lead to a much more substantial use of force in the future ... We have all learned the most important lesson in this conflict: that the international community will not be respected until it decides to take effective actions. Referring to UNPROFOR, the memorandum stated that in spite of the fact that the force was established under Chapter VII, its functions have been narrowly interpreted and its focus limited to the provision of humanitarian assistance and that, too, based on the consent of the perpetrators of the aggression. This restrictive interpretation, coupled with the denial of the inherent right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to invoke Article 51 of the Charter [to self-defence], has encouraged the Serbs to continue with their aggression. (Ibid., para. 10)

The next response was from the Permanent Representative of France who forwarded a memorandum (S/25800) to the President of the Security Council on 19 May. The French memorandum outlined changes that would have to be made to the UNPROFOR mandate to give it, more clearly than in resolution 824 (1993), the task of ensuring the security of the safe areas. To this end a new resolution should provide explicitly for the possibility of recourse to the [use of] force, by all necessary means. It explained that the general aim of the scheme should be to stop territorial gains by the Serbian forces. (Ibid., para. 3)

In their memorandum the French outlined three options which could be considered:

The task of UNPROFOR in the first two options would be to deter aggression. The following criteria might trigger the use of force, determined in a limited way:

The French memorandum specified that a symbolic United Nations presence would be required in each safe area for the light option without formed units. For the light option with formed units a brigade (5,000 soldiers) would be required in Sarajevo, plus a battalion (900 soldiers) each in Bihaç and Tuzla, a battalion divided between Srebrenica and ðepa, and a battalion divided between Gorañde and Fo…a. For the heavy option a division would be required in Sarajevo, and a brigade in each of the other areas. The memorandum concluded that the effective participation on the ground of the United States and the Russian Federation with the countries already involved would confer added credibility to such a concept of safe areas and might make the light options sufficient. (Ibid., paras. 5-8)

A third response came on 22 May, when representatives of the Governments of France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Washington, D.C., agreeing on a >Joint Action Programme. The meeting followed an unsuccessful mission to Europe by the United States Secretary of State seeking support for a lift and strike policy - (i.e., lifting of the arms embargo and striking the BSA from the air). The Joint Action Programme attempted to bridge the positions of the various governments concerned. Instead of insisting that the Serbs accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as a complete package, as earlier statements had done, the Programme spoke of building on the Vance-Owen process, and encouraged the parties to the conflict to implement promptly mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan. The Programme referred to the continuation of humanitarian assistance, to the rigorous enforcement of sanctions against the Serbs, to the possible sealing of the Yugoslav border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, to continued enforcement of the no-fly zone, to the rapid establishment of a War Crimes Tribunal and to the valuable contribution that could be made by the concept of safe areas. (S/25829)

The Joint Action Programme was strongly criticized by members of the Non-Aligned Caucus who objected to the lack of clear commitment to reversing the consequences of Serbian aggression. The Caucus also expressed concern about what its members saw as the abandonment of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and was particularly sceptical about the advancement of a weak safe area policy as a substitute for more resolute action such as the lifting of the arms embargo.

The Security Council then asked the Secretariat to prepare within 24 hours a working paper on safe areas, which was presented to the Council, the next day, on 28 May. That unofficial working paper stated that any concept of safe areas must assume the cooperation of the warring parties. Without a cease-fire in the region of the safe areas, the concept of safe areas is virtually impossible to implement. The paper laid out the argument that peacekeeping operations could only succeed with the consent of the parties, and that the Serbs would certainly not consent to any arrangement which put UNPROFOR in the way of their military objectives. Having said that, the paper then stated that if UNPROFOR is given the task to enforce the establishment of a safe area (i.e. Chapter VII) it is likely to require combat support arms such as artillery and perhaps even close air support. The Secretariat paper laid out a number of options for the size and composition of United Nations units in each safe area:

The distinction being made between a military capability to protect the safe area and an UNPROFOR presence capable of defending the safe area against possible aggression was not explained, though estimates of the numbers of troops required to implement each option were given as follows:

H.
Security Council resolution 836 (1993)

France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States then co-sponsored a resolution based substantially on the French memorandum of 19 May. The Security Council began deliberations on it on 1 June, and voted on the draft resolution on 4 June 1993. It was adopted by 13 votes in favour, with two abstentions (Pakistan and Venezuela), becoming Security Council resolution 836 (1993). Three paragraphs of the resolution, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, were seen as particularly important:

Paragraph 5:

It is essential to note that the resolution explicitly eschewed the use of the words protect or defend, and asked UNPROFOR only to occupy some key points on the ground and linked the use of force to the phrase acting in self-defence. As the following section indicates, some members of the Council nonetheless took a broader view of the resolution.

I.
The Security Council members positions on resolution 836 (1993)

At the meeting during which the vote was taken (S/PV.3228 of 4 June 1993), representatives of the 15 Security Council members made statements commenting on the resolution, as did the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey.

The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a non-member of the Security Council, noted that the informal working paper presented by the Secretariat had characterized the implementation of the safe area policy as not realistically possible. He stated that the resolution appeared to be diplomatic cover for some of its co-sponsors to mitigate the need and responsibility for more resolute and comprehensive measures. He spoke of a continuing lack of will to confront Serb attacks on the Bosniac enclaves. The representative of Turkey was also sceptical about the effectiveness of the resolution, asserting that, in passing the resolution, the international community continues to pursue its course of indecision and fails to take coercive action that would once and for all stop the aggression. He said that his Government continued strongly to advocate the use of force to stop Serbian aggression. He added that the resolution failed to acknowledge the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to self-defence -- a right which has been denied for far too long. He repeated Turkeys preparedness to contribute troops to UNPROFOR.

The representative of France, noting that his Government had issued the memorandum of 19 May in which the concept of the safe areas had been elaborated, stated that it was France and its partners which, following the adoption of the Joint Action Programme in Washington, had proposed that the Council adopt a draft resolution ensuring full respect for the safe areas named in resolution 824 (1993) ... He stated that the draft resolution addressed two objectives: the humanitarian one of ensuring the survival of the civilian populations of the safe areas, and the political one of maintaining the territorial basis needed for the Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. He said that the designation and protection of the safe areas [was] not an end in itself, but only a temporary measure: a step towards a just and lasting political solution. He characterized the draft resolution as realistic and operational, and believed that it would be a first step towards implementing the Vance-Owen Plan. He concluded by stating that, in adopting the text, the Council [would] demonstrate that the international community is not standing idly by.

The representative of Venezuela, who abstained rather than voting in favour of the draft resolution, spoke at length, criticizing it on two grounds: first, that it could not be implemented without substantial resources which might not be forthcoming, and, second, that it provided cover for an unwillingness to support the broader and more meaningful goals of the fair and equitable distribution of territory between the various communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the first point, the representative stated that the draft resolution could not be implemented without the resolve to do so and until the Secretary-General had the necessary means and resources... He noted that the Non-Aligned Caucus had wanted the Secretary-General to report formally on the safe area concept before the vote was taken on the draft resolution. Unfortunately, it [had been] decided not to await the opinion of the Secretary-General. The representative referred to the objective and highly critical evaluation of the concept made by the Secretary-General in the unofficial working paper of 28 May. He noted that the Secretary-General had already asked Council members particularly valid questions about the precise role of the United Nations, and whether or not the United Nations would be expected to use force if the Serbs did not comply with the resolution. He noted also that these questions had not been satisfactorily answered, and predicted that the safe areas would not be safe at all. On the second point, he criticized the Joint Action Programme and the view that all that are needed are containment and prevention measures: safe areas, border monitors, strengthening sanctions, the prohibition of overflights, a tribunal for crimes against humanitarian law. He asked whether Council members could believe that this attitude would convince the aggressors that it is best graciously to renounce what they have conquered by terror and force. He called on the Council to respect and apply collective security, which ensures the right to self-defence, as guaranteed by the Charter.

The representative of Pakistan, who also abstained rather than voting in favour of the draft resolution, supported expeditious and comprehensive action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to enforce its decisions and to authorize the use of all necessary measures, including the use of air strikes against key strategic targets, to halt the Serbian aggression, [and] reverse it through withdrawals from all territories occupied by the use of force and >ethnic cleansing... He drew the attention of Council members to the fundamental shortcomings of this concept of the safe areas, but reiterated his Governments offer to provide troops to UNPROFOR in connection with the implementation of the draft resolution. He urged the Council to take further appropriate steps, including the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in conformity with its inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter ...

The representative of New Zealand stated that his Government supported the resolution on the understanding that force, in the form of air strikes, could be used if UNPROFOR was prevented from carrying out its tasks or if humanitarian assistance continued to be interdicted. He urged the Council to send a message to the Serbs that they should cease their activities in and around the safe areas, or face swift consequences. Any message less than this -- as a first step -- would be, in our view, gravely damaging to the Councils reputation and, indeed, to the United Nations as a whole. The representative of Djibouti said that he would vote in favour of the resolution, accepting in good faith the strong affirmations of the sponsoring Members that this time they do indeed mean business.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Brazil stated that: There should be no doubt in anyones mind that this resolution can be considered neither the ideal nor the final response of the Security Council to the conflict. He had voted in favour of the resolution because, in spite of its shortcomings ... it constitutes a concrete step and embodies a significant qualitative change in the way the Council has been dealing with the matter so far.

The representative of the Russian Federation noted that his delegation was among the sponsors of the resolution, and that the resolution set out a serious package of very effective and genuinely practicable measures. His delegation was convinced that the implementation of the resolution would be an important practical step for the international community genuinely to curb the violence and to stop the shooting on the long-suffering land of the Bosnians. Henceforth, any attempted military attacks, shooting and shelling of safe areas, any armed incursions into those areas, and any hindrance to the delivery of humanitarian assistance [would] be stopped by the United Nations forces by using all necessary means, including the use of armed force. He spoke in favour of the Joint Action Programme and concluded that the Washington programme does not exclude the adoption of new, firmer measures: nothing has been ruled in or ruled out.

The representative of the United States of America said that her Government had co-sponsored the resolution because it saw it as a means to save lives ... She added: the United States voted for this resolution with no illusions. It is an intermediate step -- no more, no less. Indeed, both the Security Council and the Governments that developed the Joint Action Programme have agreed that they will keep open options for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration. My Governments view of what those tougher measures should be has not changed. The United States Government expected the full cooperation of the Bosnian Serb party in implementing this resolution. If that cooperation [was] not forthcoming, [it would] move to seek further action in the Security Council.

The representative of China noted that the humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had dramatically deteriorated. Under the present circumstances, the establishment of a number of safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina may as well be tried as a temporary measure in order to reduce conflicts and ease the peoples afflictions. He stressed, however, that the safe area policy could not provide a fundamental political solution to the conflict, and predicted that the policy might encounter a series of difficulties in the course of implementation. He said that the invoking of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to authorize the use of force, as well as the implication in the resolution that further military action would be taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina [might], instead of helping the effort to seek an enduring peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, further complicate the issue there, and adversely affect the peace process.

The representative of Hungary stated that the solutions set out in that resolution are far from ideal ... This resolution treats only the symptoms, because it does not give a fully convincing response to the key issue, at present, in the Bosnian conflict: reversing the results of the aggression which has been carried out with impunity in that country. Hungary had voted in favour of the resolution because it understood it as authorizing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to resort to force in response to bombardments of safe areas or armed incursions or if there [were] deliberate impediments in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or protected humanitarian convoys. He said that the action in which the international community [was] now engaged [fell] under the heading of too little, too late.

The representative of the United Kingdom spoke positively about the Joint Action Programme, describing the safe area policy as an essential step in the immediate agenda of the Programme. The aim is to provide further help to large concentrations of the civilian population, most of whom are Muslims. A new element was that the United Kingdom, with France and the United States, probably acting in a NATO framework, were prepared to make available air power in response to calls for assistance from United Nations forces in and around the safe areas. To implement this concept of safe areas effectively, the United Nations [would] need some further troops, and [the United Kingdom would] support the Secretary-General in his efforts to attract new contributions, including from some Islamic States. The safe areas would not stop the war and were a temporary measure. Noting that there were some suggestions that a policy of safe areas might be combined with a lifting of the arms embargo, he said that his Government did not see the combination of these elements as an option and that the two policies were distinct and alternative. It would be hard to reconcile the supply of arms with United Nations peacekeeping on the ground. He then spoke in favour of the negotiating efforts of Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, and noted that neither the Joint Action Programme nor the view of the Government of the United Kingdom ruled out other, stronger measures as the situation develops.

The representative of Spain stated that with the expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate to ensure full respect of the safe areas, [the Security Council had] taken an important step aimed at saving lives, protecting threatened territories, permitting free access to humanitarian assistance and also facilitating the future application of the Vance-Owen peace plan. He added that UNPROFORs reinforced protection of the six areas mentioned in the resolution [was] aimed at increasing their security and providing higher levels of safety and well-being for the threatened civilian population.

J.
Reluctance to use force to deter attacks on the safe areas

Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 836 (1993), the Serbs continued to bombard the safe areas at about the same rate as before. In Sarajevo, for example, Serb shells continued to land in the safe area at an average rate of approximately 1,000 per day, usually into civilian-inhabited areas, often in ways calculated to maximize civilian casualties, sometimes at random, and only occasionally for identifiably military purposes. This pattern, which had begun on 6 April 1992, continued, with lulls of varying lengths, until Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995. The Serbs also continued to obstruct freedom of movement to all of the safe areas, both for UNPROFOR and for humanitarian convoys, imposing a system of clearances, the principal effect of which was to limit the effectiveness of UNPROFOR and to slow down the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Shortly after the adoption of resolution 836 (1993), the Secretariat convened a meeting of the resolutions sponsors (France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States) and Canada. The Secretariat made an oral presentation in which it stated that approximately 32,000 additional ground troops would be required to implement the safe area concept. This drew strong opposition, particularly from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who insisted that the preferred approach would be closer to the light option presented in the French memorandum, which would entail some 5,000 additional troops.

The Secretariat then informed UNPROFOR that none of the co-sponsors was willing to contribute any additional troops for UNPROFOR, and that none of them seemed to envisage a force capable of effectively defending these areas. The Secretariat believed that there was unanimity among the co-sponsors that the extension of UNPROFORs mandate to include a capacity to deter attack against the safe areas should not be construed as signifying deployment in sufficient strength to repel attacks by military force. UNPROFORs major deterrent capacity, rather than being a function of military strength, would essentially flow from its presence in the safe areas. The Secretariat referred to the positive example of Srebrenica, where, it was felt the success of the approach had been demonstrated. The Secretariat added that UNPROFORs role to promote the withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces was said to call for persuasion rather than coercion. The Secretariat informed UNPROFOR that the resolutions co-sponsors shared the Secretariats own concern that any air strikes would pose grave dangers to UNPROFORs personnel and the humanitarian convoys and should, therefore, be initiated with the greatest restraint and, essentially, in self-defence.

K.
Secretary-Generals report to the Security Council (25939) pursuant to resolution 836 (1993)

The Secretary-General presented the first of several reports in which he outlined his views on the implementation of the safe area concept on 14 June. (S/25939). He noted that, in order to ensure full respect for the safe areas, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR estimated that an additional troop requirement at an indicative level of 34,000 would be required to obtain deterrence through strength. He went on to note, however, that it would be possible to start implementing the resolution under a light option envisaging a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. While this option cannot, in itself, completely guarantee the defence of the safe areas, it relies on the threat of air action against any of the belligerents. (S/25939, paragraph 5)

Concerning Srebrenica, the Secretary-General stated that the existing force levels would not have to be enhanced under the light option. He did state, however, that, since it is assumed that UNPROFOR ground troops will not be sufficient to resist a concentrated assault on any of the safe areas, particular emphasis must be placed on the availability of the air-strike capability provided by Member States. This would require the deployment of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in order that the force-multiplying characteristics of air power may be fully exploited if necessary. (S/25939, para. 4). Forward Air Controllers were later deployed in all the safe areas.

Through its resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia: approved the report of the Secretary-General; decided to authorize the deployment of the additional 7,600 troops proposed under the light option; and reaffirmed its decision in para. 10 of resolution 836 (1993) on the use of air power.

L.
Efforts to lift the arms embargo

Shortly thereafter, representatives of the Non-Aligned Caucus tabled a draft resolution which would have exempted the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia under resolution 713 (1991). The Council voted on the draft resolution on 29 June, and rejected it by six votes in favour (Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan, the United States and Venezuela), to none against, and nine abstentions (Brazil, China, France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Spain and the United Kingdom).

Several Council members, and a number of other Permanent Representatives, who had asked to participate in the discussion of the draft resolution, made a connection between the safe area policy and the effort to lift the arms embargo. Representatives of several members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) said that they viewed the concept underlying Security Council resolution 836 (1993) as flawed from the beginning. They suggested that, if the Council was unable to take action to halt the conflict or to protect the Bosniac population, then the Council should at least allow the Bosniacs to defend themselves. The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina saw the safe area regime as an expression of the lack of will of some countries to provide an effective deterrent to Serb aggression. That being the case, the safe area regime could, at best, benefit some people temporarily, but none permanently. Given the lack of will in the international community, Bosnia and Herzegovina now sought to reassert its right to obtain the means of self-defense.

The representative of Pakistan noted that his country, together with other non-aligned members of the Council, had originally supported the establishment of safe areas, but felt that the experience in Srebrenica, ðepa and Gorañde had revealed the fundamental shortcomings of the concept in the absence of any real resolve. In his view, the safe area policy had become an instrument for freezing the situation on the ground to the full advantage of the Serbs. He felt that the lack of resolve within the Council had emboldened the Serbs. Thirteen representatives of Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference also spoke in favour of the draft, as did the representatives of Costa Rica, Slovenia, Venezuela and the United States.

The representative of the United Kingdom, leading those who opposed the draft resolution, also referred to the safe area policy. On the ground in Bosnia, he said, top priority had to be given to making the safe areas safe. He described the response to the decisions of the Council to reinforce UNPROFOR with 7,500 troops and to back up those troops with the deterrent threat of air strikes as encouraging. The representative of France, who also opposed the draft, said that reasons of principle, timeliness and substance stood in the way of exempting the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo. He said that the role of the Council was not war or waging it. To lift the arms embargo selectively, would, in his view, contravene the principles of the Council. Such a decision would disastrously interfere with the Geneva talks now under way. He added that the safe area concept, although not perfect, must be given a chance to succeed. He noted that more than 6,000 men could be made available by participating countries. He concluded by saying that France had contributed 6,300 troops to UNPROFOR and that his country would not accept lessons in morality from anyone. Croatia, Yugoslavia, Japan, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Hungary, China, Brazil, New Zealand and Spain also spoke against the resolution.