First Net Print, Tuesday, February 01, 2000
Second  Net Print, October 30 2001

120. The International Commission of Inquiry, in preparing its conclusions for submission to the Secretary–General, has carefully considered the testimony of witnesses, the reports of experts, information provided by the United Nations in East Timor and INTERFET, reports of other organizations and its own observations in East Timor. It has also carefully considered the information and views provided by the Government of Indonesia, and the Indonesian Commission of Inquiry.

121. Due to the limitations, including time constraint encountered by the International Commission, its fact finding mission should be regarded as a starting point in the process of bringing those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to justice.

122. The evidence gathered has led the Commission to a number of conclusions about the pattern of human rights violations in East Timor since January 1999 and those responsible for those violations. On the basis of those conclusions and in the light of the specific circumstances of the violations of human rights and breaches of humanitarian law in East Timor, the Commission has agreed on a number of recommendations.

123. The International Commission of Inquiry has concluded that there were patterns of gross violations of human rights and breaches of humanitarian law which varied over time and took the form of systematic and widespread intimidation, humiliation and terror, destruction of property, violence against women and displacement of people. Patterns were also found relating to the destruction of evidence and the involvement of the Indonesian Army (TNI) and the militias in the violations. More specifically, the International Commission would like to emphasise the following:

124. The evidence gathered shows that intimidation and terror were systematically used to prevent the people from freely exercising their political choice. Before the popular consultation ballot, intimidation and terror were primarily aimed at pro-independence groups and individuals. In the post- ballot period and after the announcement of the results, the attacks were widespread and took the form of vengeance.

125. There is evidence of threats of violence against persons and actual violence resulting in injuries and deaths in large numbers. The killings were often brutal and gruesome. In some instances, massacres took place in sites where people had sought refuge.

126. Because the men fled to the mountains, the women were targeted for sexual assault in a cruel and systematic way.

127. There is evidence of actual sexual abuse and rape of women. While in general, the militia refrained from killing women, they were subjected to humiliation and different forms of harassment that includes, stripping and sexual slavery. Women and children were also victims of forced displacement into exile.

128. Local and international staff of UNAMET, other humanitarian agencies, NGOs and journalists were also targeted by the militia and TNI. After the announcement of the results of the consultation, this resulted in the evacuation of local and international staff of UNAMET and other agencies, as well as journalists and others. This seemed to be in order to prevent them from witnessing acts of violence and destruction of property that took place subsequently.

129. The acts of violence by militia and TNI included, burning down of houses and office buildings of pro-independence groups. The evidence gathered shows that before the popular consultation ballot, destruction of property was selective and not widespread, involving properties of specific individuals known for their support for pro-independence.

130. After the announcement of the results, the destruction was widespread and systematic in towns and cities. The Commission saw for itself the extent of damage in Dili and all the other sites it visited. The damage to private and public property ranges from 60 to 80 per cent in the whole country. Even more serious is the fact that most hospitals and health centres have been destroyed, as well as school buildings. The destruction includes damage to public utilities, such as water and power. The widespread and systematic nature of the destruction indicates that it was planned and co-ordinated.

131. Evidence gathered shows that before the popular consultation ballot, intimidation and terror resulted in internal displacement of people. People sought refuge in churches and other safe areas, including fleeing to the mountains. Intimidation of the internally displaced included killings in places of refuge, denial of access to humanitarian agencies and, in some instances, denial of necessities such as water. The intimidation was aimed at dispersing people from their places of refuge.

132. After the announcement of the results of the popular consultation, thousands of people were forcibly assembled and moved to West Timor. The evidence shows that people were moved by sea and by road. The movement and evacuation of people would not have been possible without prior planning and a systematic execution of the plan.

133. Evidence gathered from people who have returned from West Timor shows that the people in the camps in West Timor have been subjected to intimidation and terror. The Commission also received reports of the abduction of children from camps. There is evidence of intimidation by militia to prevent those who want to return to East Timor from doing so. Due to all this, it was thus extremely frustrating for the Commission not to have been able to visit West Timor as it had requested from the beginning.

134. The information gathered by the Commission shows that there was a systematic attempt to destroy evidence, including removal of bodies from the site of killings. The removal of dead bodies to West Timor from the massacre site in Suai church is a clear indication of the extent of efforts to conceal evidence. The Commission was in Dili when bodies of victims of the Suai massacre were brought back from West Timor after having been exhumed there by the Indonesian National Commission of Inquiry. There are possibilities that more bodies will be found on a day to day basis.

135. Evidence gathered shows that militia groups were responsible for the intimidation and terror experienced by the people of East Timor before and after the popular consultation.

136. The evidence further shows that the number of militia groups and their activities increased from January 1999. There is also evidence that the Indonesian Army and the civilian authorities in East Timor and some in Jakarta pursued a policy of engaging the militia to influence the outcome of the popular consultation. The approach pursued was to provide the impression that the East Timorese were fighting among themselves.

137. There is evidence that the policy of engaging militias was implemented by the Kopassus (Special Forces Command of TNI) and other intelligence agencies of the Indonesian army. The policy manifested itself in the form of active recruitment, funding, arming and guidance and of the provision of logistics to support the militias in intimidation and terror attacks.

138. There is evidence to show that, in certain cases, Indonesian army personnel, in addition to directing the militias, were directly involved in intimidation and terror attacks. The intimidation, terror, destruction of property, displacement and evacuation of people would not have been possible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval of the top military command.

139. The Indonesian police, who were responsible for security under the 5 May agreement, appear to have been involved in acts of intimidation and terror and in other cases to have been inactive in preventing such acts.

140. The Commission is of the view that ultimately the Indonesian army was responsible for the intimidation, terror, killings and other acts of violence experienced by the people of East Timor before and after the popular consultation. Further, the evidence collected to date indicates that particular individuals were directly involved in violations of human rights.

141. The Commission received allegations that armed groups supporting independence were also involved in violent attacks during the period from January 1999. The incidents were relatively fewer in number and confirmation of their existence has not been obtained.

142. There is no doubt that the evidence gathered clearly demonstrates a pattern of serious violations of fundamental human rights and humanitarian law in East Timor. The violations include, but are not limited to, violations of the rights to life and to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, violence against women, and violations of rights relating to freedom of assembly, association, opinion and expression, freedom from arbitrary arrest and exile, and freedom of movement and residence, and the right to own property. In addition, and particularly after the proclamation of the results of the consultation, further human rights were violated through the large-scale destruction, including the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing, housing and medical care, and the right to education.

1. Rapid return of displaced persons.

143. The Commission of Inquiry is deeply concerned about those individuals and families who were displaced from East Timor to other parts of Indonesia after the announcement of the results of the consultation and who are being retained against their will in camps without adequate contact with UNHCR or ICRC and who wish to return to their homes in dignity and safety. The Commission calls for the rapid resolution of this problem.

144. The Commission of Inquiry calls for the disarming of the militias in West Timor as an important step towards enabling the East Timorese to return home safely. The Commission also calls for the demobilization of all non-regular forces in East Timor that are still under arms.

145. During its time in East Timor, the International Commission became acutely aware of the suffering of the people of East Timor by reason of the violations of human rights which had taken place. It also noted that most of the East Timorese who addressed themselves to the Commission did not call for revenge or retribution, but sought justice, recognition of their rights and reconciliation.

146. The Commission believes it has a special responsibility to speak out on behalf of the victims who may not have easy access to international forums. They must not be forgotten in the rush of events to redefine relations in the region, and their basic human rights to justice, compensation and the truth must be fully respected. This is a responsibility which the United Nations must shoulder both in the short and long terms, in particular in its trusteeship relation with the people of East Timor as it administers the territory towards independence.

147. The actions violating human rights and international humanitarian law in East Timor were directed against a decision of the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter and were contrary to agreements reached by Indonesia with the United Nations to carry out that Security Council decision. Under Article 25 of the Charter, Member States agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The organized opposition in East Timor to the Security Council decision requires specific international attention and response. The United Nations, as an organization, has a vested interest in participating in the entire process of investigation, establishing responsibility and punishing those responsible and in promoting reconciliation. Effectively dealing with this issue will be important for ensuring that future Security Council decisions are respected.

148. Future action with regard to the violations of human rights in East Timor should be governed by the following human rights principles: the individual's right to have an effective remedy for violations of human rights, which includes the State's responsibility to investigate violations, prosecute criminally and punish those responsible; the individual's right to reparation and compensation for violations of human rights from the State responsible for the violations; the need to act against impunity in order to discourage future violations of basic human rights.

149. The Commission of Inquiry concludes that, for the reasons set out above, the investigations into the violations and those responsible must be continued. This is especially important because new information and testimonies are daily becoming available with the return of people to East Timor.

150. In order to enable ongoing investigations to be continued and to avoid loss of evidence while the international investigation recommended below is being set up, full support should be given to the investigations being carried out by UNTAET. UNTAET should receive the forensic and investigative assistance it has requested, as well as the assistance required to set up rapidly a functioning judicial system in East Timor. The collaboration established between the United Nations and the Indonesian National Commission of Inquiry should also be pursued and support should be given to that Commission's investigations in Indonesia of violations committed in East Timor, and particularly for those reportedly still taking place in West Timor.

151. In considering how the future investigations of human rights and international humanitarian law violations could be organized and how those responsible could be punished and reparations made to the victims, the International Commission of Inquiry considered a number of specific suggestions. Some proposals were for an international criminal tribunal and others referred to experiences in other countries with truth and reconciliation commissions. In light of the above considerations and in order to respond to the violations of human rights in East Timor and to respond to the rights of the victims, the International Commission of Inquiry recommends the following;

152. The United Nations should establish an independent and international body charged with:

• Conducting further systematic investigations of the human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law in East Timor during the period from January 1999;
• Identifying the persons responsible for those violations, including those with command responsibilities;
• Ensuring reparations for the violations from those responsible;
• Prosecuting those guilty of serious human rights violations within the framework of its function to ensure justice; and
• Considering the issues of truth and reconciliation.

153. The United Nations should establish an international human rights tribunal consisting of judges appointed by the United Nations, preferably with the participation of members from East Timor and Indonesia. The tribunal would sit in Indonesia, East Timor and any other relevant territory to receive the complaints and to try and sentence those accused by the independent investigation body of serious violations of fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law which took place in East Timor since January 1999 regardless of the nationality of the individual or where that person was when the violations were committed

154. The International Commission of Inquiry makes these proposals to enable the Secretary General to recommend establishment of an appropriate mechanism taking into account various bodies that have been established previously for ensuring justice and reconciliation.

155. It is fundamental for the future social and political stability of East Timor, that the truth be established and those responsible for the crimes committed be brought to justice. Every effort has to be made to provide adequate reparation to the victims for only then can true reconciliation take place.

156. The International Commission of Inquiry wishes to express its appreciation to all those who assisted in its work and particularly the staff of UNAMET/UNTAET and INTERFET for the support provided in East Timor.

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